Given a rank-1 bimatrix game (A,B), i.e., where rank(A+B)=1, we construct a suitable linear subspace of the rank-1 game space and show that this subspace is homeomorphic to its Nash equilibriumâ€¦ (More)

Much work has been done on the computation of market equilibria. However due to strategic play by buyers, it is not clear whether these are actually observed in the market. Motivated by theâ€¦ (More)

Motivated by the sequence form formulation of Koller et al. [19], this paper defines bilinear games, and proposes efficient algorithms for its rank based subclasses. Bilinear games are two-playerâ€¦ (More)

A recent line of work, starting with Beigman and Vohra [4] and Zadimoghaddam and Roth [27], has addressed the problem of learning a utility function from revealed preference data. The goal here is toâ€¦ (More)

The rank of a bimatrix game (A, B) is defined as rank(A + B). Computing a Nash equilibrium (NE) of a rank-0, i.e., zero-sum game is equivalent to linear programming (von Neumann'28, Dantzig'51). Inâ€¦ (More)

In a recent series of papers [7, 8, 6] a surprisingly strong connection was discovered between standard models of evolution in mathematical biology and Multiplicative Weights Updates Algorithm, aâ€¦ (More)

Single minded agents have strict preferences, in which a bundle is acceptable only if it meets a certain demand. Such preferences arise naturally in scenarios such as allocating computationalâ€¦ (More)

Using the powerful machinery of the linear complementarity problem and Lemkeâ€™s algorithm, we give a practical algorithm for computing an equilibrium for Arrow-Debreu markets under separable,â€¦ (More)

As a result of a series of important works [7--9, 15, 23], the complexity of two-player Nash equilibrium is by now well understood, even when equilibria with special properties are desired and whenâ€¦ (More)