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Departures from self-interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of " social preferences ". We design a range of simple experimental games that test these theories more directly than existing experiments. Our experiments show that subjects are more concerned with increasing social welfare—sacrificing to increase the payoffs for all(More)
We used functional MRI (fMRI) to investigate human mental processes in a competitive interactive setting--the "beauty contest" game. This game is well-suited for investigating whether and how a player's mental processing incorporates the thinking process of others in strategic reasoning. We apply a cognitive hierarchy model to classify subject's choices in(More)
  • Miguel A Costa-Gomes, Vincent P Crawford, Maynard Keynes, Costa-Gomes, We, Bruno Broseta +13 others
  • 2006
This paper reports an experiment that elicits subjects' initial responses to 16 dominance-solvable two-person guessing games. The structure is publicly announced except for varying payoff parameters, to which subjects are given free access. Varying the parameters allows very strong separation of the behavior implied by leading decision rules. Subjects'(More)
Acknowledgments: We wish to thank Ernan Haruvy for his comments on a preliminary version. We acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education through grants SEC98-1853-CE and DGES PB96-0300, and the EU-TMR Research Network ENDEAR (FMRX-CT98-0238). We thank the Spanish newspaper Expansión and the German magazine Spektrum der Wissenschaft(More)
The theory of global games has shown that coordination games with multiple equilib-ria may have a unique equilibrium if certain parameters of the payoff function are private information instead of common knowledge. We report the results of an experiment designed to test the predictions of this theory. Comparing sessions with common and private information,(More)
  • Anna Bayona, Jose Apesteguia, Ariadna Dumitrescu, Angel L Lopez, Carolina Manzano, Margaret Meyer +3 others
  • 2015
I analyse the equilibrium and welfare properties of an economy characterised by uncertainty and payoff externalities, in a general model which nests several applications. Agents receive a private signal and an endogenous public signal, which is a noisy aggregate of individual actions. I analyse how endogenous public information, which causes an information(More)
History contains many colorful examples where speculative trade in some commodity or financial asset generated a phase of rapidly increasing prices, followed by a sudden collapse (see, e.g., Edward Chancellor, 1999, or Charles Kindleberger, 2001). One famous case cited by many economists (see Peter Garber, 2000, pp. 127–31, for references) is the Dutch "(More)
This paper explores predictability of behavior in coordination games with multiple equilibria. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects' certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Attitudes towards strategic uncertainty in coordination games are related to risk aversion, experience seeking, gender and age. From the(More)