Roger Lagunoff

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* An earlier version of this paper was circulated under the title " Deliberations and Double-Sided Information ". This project originated from a series of conversations with David Austen-Smith and Tim Feddersen, whom we thank for their attention and support. We are grateful to for helpful comments and suggestions. All errors are our own. Abstract We analyze(More)
This paper presents a dynamic, stochastic game-theoretic model of financial fragility. The model has two essential features. First, interrelated portfolios and payment commitments forge financial linkages among agents. Second, iid shocks to investment projects' operations at a single date cause some projects to fail. Investors who experience losses from(More)
This paper examines the Faustian dynamics of policy and power. We posit a general class of dynamic games in which current policies affect the future distribution of political power, resulting in the following " Faustian trade off " : if the current ruler chooses his preferred policy, he then sacrifices future political power; yet if he wants to preserve his(More)
We ask whether communication can directly substitute for memory in dynastic repeated games in which short lived individuals care about the utility of their offspring who replace them in an infinitely repeated game. Each individual is unable to observe what happens before his entry in the game. Past information is therefore conveyed from one cohort to the(More)
This article formalizes investor rationality and irrationality, exuberance and apprehension, to consider the implications of belief formation for the fragility of an economy's financial structure. The model presented generates a financial structure with portfolio linkages that make it susceptible to contagious financial crises, despite the absence of(More)
When are political institutions stable? When do they tend toward reform? This paper examines a model of dynamic, endogenous institutional change. I introduce a class of dynamic political games in which the political aggregation rules used at date t + 1 are instrumental choices under rules at date t. A political rule is stable if it selects itself. A reform(More)
We analyze " dynastic " repeated games. A stage game is repeatedly played by successive generations of finitely-lived players with dynastic preferences. Each individual has preferences that replicate those of the infinitely-lived players of a standard discounted infinitely-repeated game. When all players observe the past history of play, the standard(More)
This paper examines the mechanics of intertemporal information provision in dynastic governments. It has been suggested that " horizontal accountability, " i.e., a system of governance where auditing functions lie outside the executive branch, can ensure credible disclosure of information. The results here suggest a cautious approach to that view.(More)
This paper studies the evolution of political institutions in the face of conflict. We examine institutional reform in a class of pivotal mechanisms—institutions that behave as if the resulting policy were determined by a " pivotal " decision maker drawn from the potential population of citizens and who holds full policy-making authority at the time. A(More)