Roger Lagunoff

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We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to efficient outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The characterizations are illustrated in a series of examples, including voluntary contribution public good games,(More)
Why would an enfranchised elite voluntarily dilute its power by expanding the franchise? The central intuition behind our analysis is that the dilution of power by an enfranchised elite is equivalent to the delegation of power by one member of the elite—a pivotal voter—to another citizen, who in turn becomes the pivotal voter in the new (expanded) elite.(More)
Do mandatory spending programs such as Medicare improve efficiency? We analyze a model with two parties allocating a fixed budget to a public good and private transfers each period over an infinite horizon. We compare two institutions that differ in whether public good spending is discretionary or mandatory. We model mandatory spending as an endogenous(More)
When are political institutions stable? When do they tend toward reform? This paper examines a model of dynamic, endogenous institutional change. I introduce a class of dynamic political games in which the political aggregation rules used at date t + 1 are instrumental choices under rules at date t. A political rule is stable if it selects itself. A reform(More)
This paper studies the evolution of political institutions in the face of conflict. We examine institutional reform in a class of pivotal mechanisms—institutions that behave as if the resulting policy were determined by a " pivotal " decision maker drawn from the potential population of citizens and who holds full policy-making authority at the time. A(More)
This paper studies the optimal contest design problem when the abilities of the risk neutral contestants are independent private information. The contest designer has a fixed prize budget to elicit efforts from the contestants. We consider all possible mechanisms that allocate prizes and punishments (negative prizes) across the contestants. We find that an(More)