• Publications
  • Influence
Do Actions Speak Louder than Words
We study the relative performance of disclosure and auditing in organizations. We consider the information transmission problem between two decision makers who take actions at dates 1 and 2Expand
A Model of Financial Fragility
TLDR
A dynamic, stochastic game-theoretic model of financial fragility that considers whether fragility is worse for larger economies and whether all of its linkages break from such a crisis. Expand
Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games
TLDR
It is shown that for sufficient patient players, there is a unique perfect equilibrium payoff which Pareto dominates all other payoffs and this result generalizes to any finite number of players and any game in a class of asynchronously repeated games which includes both stochastic and deterministic repetition. Expand
Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games
This paper examines Markov Perfect equilibria of general, finite state stochastic games. Our main result is that the number of such equilibria is finite for a set of stochastic game payoffs with fullExpand
On the size and structure of group cooperation
TLDR
The maximal average cooperation (MAC) likelihood is the highest average level of cooperation, over all stationary subgame perfect equilibrium paths, that the group can achieve, and larger groups are more cooperative, on average, than smaller ones. Expand
On the Faustian Dynamics of Policy and Political Power
This paper examines the Faustian dynamics of policy and power. We posit a general class of dynamic games in which current policies affect the future distribution of political power, resulting in theExpand
Social Memory and Evidence from the Past
Examples of repeated destructive behavior abound throughout the history of human societies. This paper examines the role of social memory -- a society's vicarious beliefs about the past -- inExpand
Markov Perfect Equilibria in Repeated Asynchronous Choice Games
TLDR
The main result is that the number of Markov Perfect equilibria is generically finite with respect to stage game payoffs. Expand
Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: 'Whitewashes' and 'Coverups'
We ask whether communication can directly substitute for memory in dynastic repeated games in which short lived individuals care about the utility of their offspring who replace them in an infinitelyExpand
Communication and Learning
TLDR
This work studies strategic information transmission in an organization consisting of an infinite sequence of individual decision makers and shows that if preferences are not perfectly aligned "full learning" equilibria - ones in which the individuals' posterior beliefs eventually place full weight on the true state - do not exist. Expand
...
1
2
3
4
5
...