Learn More
We present Tor, a circuit-based low-latency anonymous communication service. This second-generation Onion Routing system addresses limitations in the original design. Tor adds perfect forward secrecy, congestion control, directory servers, integrity checking, configurable exit policies, and a practical design for rendezvous points. Tor works on the(More)
We present a design for a system of anonymous storage which resists the attempts of powerful adversaries to nd or destroy any stored data. We enumerate distinct notions of anonymity for each party in the system, and suggest a way to classify anonymous systems based on the kinds of anonymity provided. Our design ensures the availability of each document for(More)
We present Mixminion, a message-based anonymous re-mailer protocol with secure single-use reply blocks. Mix nodes cannot distinguish Mixminion forward messages from reply messages, so forward and reply messages share the same anonymity set. We add directory servers that allow users to learn public keys and performance statistics of participating remailers,(More)
The variety of possible anonymity network topologies has spurred much debate in recent years. In a synchronous batching design, each batch of messages enters the mix network together, and the messages proceed in lockstep through the network. We show that a synchronous batching strategy can be used in various topologies, including a free-route network, in(More)
The literature contains a variety of different mixes, some of which have been used in deployed anonymity systems. We explore their anonymity and message delay properties, and show how to mount active attacks against them by altering the traffic between the mixes. We show that if certain mixes are used, such attacks cannot destroy the anonymity of a(More)
We extend earlier research on mounting and resisting passive long-term end-to-end traffic analysis attacks against anonymous message systems, by describing how an eavesdropper can learn sender-receiver connections even when the substrate is a network of pool mixes, the attacker is non-global, and senders have complex behavior or generate padding messages.(More)
As Tor's user base has grown, the performance of the Tor network has suffered. This document describes our current understanding of why Tor is slow, and lays out our options for fixing it. Over the past few years, our funding (and thus our development effort) has focused on usability and blocking-resistance. We've come up with a portable self-contained(More)
Decentralized anonymity infrastructures are still not in wide use today. While there are technical barriers to a secure robust design, our lack of understanding of the incentives to participate in such systems remains a major roadblock. Here we explore some reasons why anonymity systems are particularly hard to deploy, enumerate the incentives to(More)