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The focus for the Centre is research into individual and strategic decision‐making using a combination of theoretical and experimental methods. On the theory side, members of the Centre investigate individual choice under uncertainty, cooperative and non‐cooperative game theory, as well as theories of psychology, bounded rationality and evolutionary game(More)
* Research for this paper was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, under its award no. L211252053. The project funded by this award formed part of the Council=s research programme on Risk and Human Behaviour. We are grateful for their comments on earlier versions of the paper to Graham Loomes, Robert Sugden and participants at the seminars(More)
"unfortunately, we can seldom test particular predictions in the social sciences by experiments explicitly designed to eliminate what are judged to be the most important disturbing influences." M. Friedman (1953) "The Methodology of Positive Economics". "It is rarely, if ever, possible to conduct controlled experiments with the economy. Thus economics must(More)
In this paper, we report an experimental investigation of the effect of framing on social preferences, as revealed in a one-shot linear public goods game. We use two types of indicator to measure social preferences: self-reported emotional responses ; and, as a behavioural indicator of disapproval, punishment. Our findings are that, for a given pattern of(More)
The focus for the Centre is research into individual and strategic decision-making using a combination of theoretical and experimental methods. On the theory side, members of the Centre investigate individual choice under uncertainty, cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, as well as theories of psychology, bounded rationality and evolutionary game(More)
This paper examines the robustness of institutional solutions to the credibility problem where there is no consensus about the relative costs of inflation and stabilisation policy. Models where monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank using contracts or targets assume that the preferences of the principal and the agent are known with(More)