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Motivated by the increasing use of auctions by government agencies, we consider the problem of fairly pricing public goods in a combinatorial auction. A well-known problem with the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction mechanism is that the resulting prices may not be in the core. Loosely speaking, this means the payments of the winners(More)
We report on the use of a quadratic programming technique in recent and upcoming spectrum auctions in Europe. Specifically , we compute a unique point in the core that minimizes the sum of squared deviations from a reference point, for example, from the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payments. Analyzing the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we demonstrate that the(More)
This paper presents a method for discovering and detecting shill bids in combinatorial auctions. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism is one of the most important combinatorial auctions because it can satisfy the strategy-proof property, individual rationality, and Pareto efficiency, that is, it is the only mechanism that simultaneously satisfies these(More)
In a combinational auction in which bidders can bid on any combination of goods, bid data can be of exponential size. We describe an innovative new combinatorial auction format in which bidders submit " matrix bids ". The advantage of this approach is that it provides bidders a mechanism to compactly express bids on every possible bundle. We describe many(More)
Verification Sampling for Soil Standards, the SI data collected should be adequate to conclude that no Environmental Protection Field Sampling Procedure Manual 2005 (FSPM)). Use test pits to obtain a greater cross-section view of the subsurface than the information about soil classification. standards reflect the state of the art of laboratory practices for(More)