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Motivated by the increasing use of auctions by government agencies, we consider the problem of fairly pricing public goods in a combinatorial auction. A well-known problem with the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction mechanism is that the resulting prices may not be in the core. Loosely speaking, this means the payments of the winners(More)
We report on the use of a quadratic programming technique in recent and upcoming spectrum auctions in Europe. Specifically , we compute a unique point in the core that minimizes the sum of squared deviations from a reference point, for example, from the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payments. Analyzing the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we demonstrate that the(More)
BACKGROUND As screening methods for colorectal cancer (CRC) are limited by uptake and adherence, further options are sought. A blood test might increase both, but none has yet been tested in a screening setting. OBJECTIVE We prospectively assessed the accuracy of circulating methylated SEPT9 DNA (mSEPT9) for detecting CRC in a screening population. (More)
BACKGROUND & AIMS We investigated rates of detection of proximal serrated lesions in a cohort of average-risk patients undergoing screening colonoscopies. METHODS We reviewed results from screening colonoscopies performed by attending gastroenterologists at 32 endoscopy centers from 2008-2010. Pathology slides were interpreted at the individual centers.(More)
This paper presents a method for discovering and detecting shill bids in combinatorial auctions. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism is one of the most important combinatorial auctions because it can satisfy the strategy-proof property, individual rationality, and Pareto efficiency, that is, it is the only mechanism that simultaneously satisfies these(More)