Robert Stalnaker

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This paper revisits some foundational questions concerning the abstract representation of a discourse context. The context of a conversation is represented by a body of information that is presumed to be shared by the participants in the conversation – the information that the speaker presupposes a point at which a speech act is interpreted. This notion is(More)
The paper I gave at the conference has subsequently split into two papers. The other descendant of the original paper (Stanley (forthcoming)) focuses on developing a non-contextualist account of knowledge that captures the intuitive data as well as contextualism. Discussion with the participants at the conference at the University of Massachusetts was very(More)
The possibilities we consider or eliminate in inquiry are epistemic possibilities. This disser-tation is mainly about what it is to say or believe that something is possible in this sense. Chapter 1 ('Epistemic Contradictions') describes a new puzzle about epistemic modals and uses it to explore their logic and semantics. Chapter 2 ('Nonfactualism about(More)
My dissertation asks how we affect conversational context and how it affects us when we participate in any conversation—including philosophical conversations. Chapter 1 argues that speakers make pragmatic presuppositions when they use proper names. I appeal to these presuppositions in giving a treatment of Frege's puzzle that is consistent with the claim(More)
" A Causal Theory of Counterfactuals " (forthcoming in Nous) I develop an account of counterfactual conditionals using " causal models " , and argue that this account is preferable to the currently standard account in terms of " similarity of possible worlds " due to David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker. I diagnose the attraction of counterfactual theories of(More)