Robert Parrino

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We report evidence on chief executive officer ~CEO! turnover during the 1971 to 1994 period. We find that the nature of CEO turnover activity has changed over time. The frequencies of forced CEO turnover and outside succession both increased. However, the relation between the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and firm performance did not change(More)
We examine CEO turnover and firm financial performance. Accounting measures of performance relative to other firms deteriorate prior to turnover, and improve subsequently. Relative performance improvements are positively related to institutional shareholdings and are greater when successor CEOs are hired from outside the firm than when they are insiders. We(More)
We model CEO and director compensation using firm characteristics, CEO characteristics, and governance variables. After controlling for monitoring proxies, we find a significant positive relationship between CEO and director compensation. We hypothesize that this relationship could be due to unobserved firm complexity (omitted variables), and/or to excess(More)
We investigate whether institutional investors ‘‘vote with their feet’’ when dissatisfied with a firm’s management by examining changes in equity ownership around forced CEO turnover. We find that aggregate institutional ownership and the number of institutional investors decline in the year prior to forced CEO turnover. However, selling by institutions is(More)
Puberty is regulated by the endocrine system. Disruption of that system by exposure to environmental hormone-mimicking substances (i.e. endocrine disruptors) may, therefore, affect this development profoundly. There has been a great secular trend in the earlier timing of puberty such as both puberty onset and menarche age. This is apparently caused by(More)
Mutual funds whose managers are in the same educational network as the firm’s CEO are more likely to vote against shareholder-initiated proposals to limit executive compensation than out-of-network funds are. This voting propensity is stronger when voting among the funds in a family is not unanimous. Furthermore, CEOs of firms who have relatively high(More)
We compare CEOs of electric and gas utility firms to CEOs of unregulated firms. Utility CEOs tend to be older when appointed to office, have less prestigious educational backgrounds, and are more likely to have a legal background. Despite these differences, the evidence also indicates that the likelihood of utility CEO turnover is at least as sensitive to(More)
AIM Italian national guidelines on pain management were published in 2010, but there is little information on how effective pain management is in paediatric emergency care, with other countries reporting poor levels. Using headache as an indicator, we described pain assessment in Italian emergency departments and identified predictors of algometric scale(More)
The corporate finance literature has extensively modeled the distortions in investment decisions that result from conflicts of interest between claimholders. These models generally imply that firms make suboptimal project choices, either in terms of good projects that are rejected, or bad projects that are accepted. Since it is difficult to observe(More)
This paper develops a structural model that determines default spreads in a setting where the debt’s collateral is endogenously determined by the borrower’s investment choice, and a demand variable with permanent and temporary components. We also consider the possibility that the borrower cannot commit to taking the valuemaximizing investment choice, and(More)