Robert Nuscheler

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We study the competitive effects of restricting direct access to secondary care by gatekeeping, focusing on the informational role of general practitioners (GPs). In the secondary care market there are two hospitals choosing quality and specialization. Patients, who are ex ante uninformed, can consult a GP to receive an (imperfect) diagnosis and obtain(More)
We investigate risk selection between public and private health insurance in Germany. With risk-rated premiums in the private system and community-rated premiums in the public system, advantageous selection in favor of private insurers is expected. Using 2000 to 2007 data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP), we find such selection. While(More)
The German statutory health insurance market was exposed to competition in 1996. To limit direct risk selection the regulator required open enrollment. As the risk compensation scheme, introduced in 1994, is highly incomplete, substantial incentives for risk selection exist. Due to their low premiums, company-based sickness funds have been able to attract a(More)
In a model of spatial competition, we analyze the equilibrium outcomes in markets where the product price is exogenous. Using an extended version of the Hotelling model, we assume that firms choose their locations and the quality of the product they supply. We derive the optimal price set by a welfarist regulator. If the regulator can commit to a price(More)
  • Kristien Werck, Bruno Heyndels, +8 authors Federico Revelli
  • 2007
Governments often see it as their responsibility to support cultural life and at times spend a significant amount of resources in the pursuit of this goal. The present paper analyses whether and how municipalities influence each other in this decision to spend resources on the arts (using data on local government cultural spending in 304 Flemish(More)
We develop a model to analyze parallel public and private health-care financing under two alternative public sector rationing rules: needs-based rationing and random rationing. Individuals vary in income and severity of illness. There is a limited supply of health-care resources used to treat individuals, causing some individuals to go untreated. Insurers(More)
Invoking Yaari's dual theory, we develop a model of individual vaccination decisions that incorporates quasi-hyperbolic discounting, risk aversion, and information. We test the resulting hypotheses for the flu season 2010/2011 using a representative German data set. We find a significant impact of time preferences on immunization decisions. The impact of(More)
Physician Reimbursement, Time-Consistency and the Quality of Care by Robert Nuscheler We use a model of horizontal and vertical differentiation to study physicians’ incentives to provide quality in the physician-patient relationship under price regulation. If the price is the only regulatory variable, the social planner cannot implement the first-best(More)
Increasing demand for long-term care poses at least five challenges to the policy-maker: (i) How should care be supplied, within a nursing home or within the family? (ii) What level of care should be provided in the different arrangements? (iii) How do the answers relate to the severity of dependence? (iv) How can financial strain be mitigated for families(More)
We consider a setting of dual practice, where a physician offers free public treatment and, if allowed, a private treatment for which patients have to pay out of pocket. Private treatment is superior in terms of health outcomes but more costly and time intensive. For the latter reason it generates waiting costs. As patients differ in their propensity to(More)