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- Robert Nau
- ISIPTA
- 2001

Aversion to uncertainty is commonly attributed to non-additivity of subjective probabilities for ambiguous events, as in the Choquet expected utility model. This paper shows that uncertainty aversion can be parsimoniously explained by a simple model of " partially separable " non-expected utility preferences in which the decision maker satisfies the… (More)

- Robert Nau
- ISIPTA
- 2003

The emergence of robustness as an important consideration in Bayesian statistical models has led to a renewed interest in normative models of incomplete preferences represented by imprecise (set-valued) probabilities and utilities. This paper presents a simple axiomatization of incomplete preferences and characterizes the shape of their representing sets of… (More)

It is well known that the set of correlated equilibrium distributions of an n-player noncooperative game is a convex polytope that includes all the Nash equilibrium distributions. We demonstrate an elementary yet surprising result: the Nash equilibria all lie on the boundary of the polytope. We are grateful to Francoise Forges, Dan Arce, the editors, and… (More)

- Robert Nau
- ISIPTA
- 1999

Two methods are presented for the aggregation of imprecise probabilities elicited from a group of experts in terms of betting rates. In the ÿrst method, the experts bet with a common opponent subject to limits on their personal betting stakes, and their individual and aggregate beliefs are represented by conÿdence-weighted lower and upper probabilities.… (More)

- Robert Nau
- ISIPTA
- 2005

A generalization of subjective expected utility is presented in which the primitives are a finite set of states of the world, a finite set of strategies available to the decision maker, and allocations of money. The model does not require explicit definitions of consequences (" states of the person "), nor does it rely on counterfactual preferences, nor… (More)

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