Robert Marquez

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  • Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, +6 authors Guhan Subramanian
  • 2004
We investigate the relative importance of the twenty-four provisions followed by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) and included in the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick governance index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003). We put forward an entrenchment index based on six provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison(More)
Regulatory changes and technological advances have profoundly affected the competitive landscape of credit markets. In this paper, we investigate the role of information acquisition as a strategic tool for intermediaries to respond to competitive pressures. We specify a model in which the severity of asymmetric information between banks and borrowers varies(More)
This paper explores the empirical relevance of banking market structure on growth. There is substantial evidence of a positive relationship between the level of development of the banking sector of an economy and its long-run output growth. Little is known, however, about the role played by the market structure of the banking sector on the dynamics of(More)
Using a unique sample of comparable online and in-person loan transactions, we study the determinants of arm’s-length and inside lending focusing on the di¤erential information content across debt types. We …nd that soft private information primarily underlies relationship lending whereas hard public information drives arm’s-length debt. The bank’s relative(More)
This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. This paper links the(More)
This paper examines how the informational structure of loan markets interacts with banks’ strategic behavior in determining lending standards, lending volumes, and the aggregate allocation of credit. In a setting where banks obtain private information about their clients’ creditworthiness, we show that banks may loosen lending standards when information(More)
We investigate directly whether analyst behavior influenced the likelihood of banks winning underwriting mandates for a sample of 16,625 U.S. debt and equity offerings sold between December 1993 and June 2002. We control for the strength of the issuer’s investment-banking relationships with potential competitors for the mandate, prior lending relationships,(More)
As the number of bank failures increases, the set of assets available for acquisition by the surviving banks enlarges but the total amount of available liquidity within the surviving banks falls. This results in `cash-in-the-market' pricing for liquidation of banking assets. At a suf ciently large number of bank failures, and in turn, at a suf ciently low(More)
Private information obtained by lenders leads to borrower capture to the extent that such information cannot be communicated credibly to outsiders. We analyze how this capture affects the loan portfolio allocation of informed lenders. First, we show that banks charge higher interest rates and finance relatively less creditworthy borrowers in market segments(More)