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Current debates about " Darwinizing culture " have typically focused on the validity of memetics. In this article we argue that meme-like inheritance is not a necessary requirement for descent with modification. We suggest that an alternative and more productive way of Darwinizing culture can be found in the application of phylogenetic methods. We review(More)
Individual differences in the mere willingness to think analytically has been shown to predict religious disbelief. Recently, however, it has been argued that analytic thinkers are not actually less religious; rather, the putative association may be a result of religiosity typically being measured after analytic thinking (an order effect). In light of this(More)
Despite a burgeoning science of cultural evolution, relatively little work has focused on the population structure of human cultural variation. By contrast, studies in human population genetics use a suite of tools to quantify and analyse spatial and temporal patterns of genetic variation within and between populations. Human genetic diversity can be(More)
It has been claimed that delusional and delusion-prone individuals have a tendency to gather less data before forming beliefs. Most of the evidence for this "jumping to conclusions" (JTC) bias comes from studies using the "beads task" data-gathering paradigm. However, the evidence for the JTC bias is mixed. We conducted a random-effects meta-analysis of(More)
Richerson et al. argue that relatively large cultural F ST values provide evidence for group structure and therefore scope for group selection. However, recent research on spatial patterns of cultural variation demonstrates that, as in the genetic case, apparent group structure can be a consequence of geographic clines, not group barriers. Such a pattern(More)
INTRODUCTION It has been proposed that deluded and delusion-prone individuals gather less evidence before forming beliefs than those who are not deluded or delusion-prone. The primary source of evidence for this "jumping to conclusions" (JTC) bias is provided by research that utilises the "beads task" data-gathering paradigm. However, the cognitive(More)
to four items (each scored on a four point-scale from " not at all serious " (1) to " very serious " (4)): " How serious of a threat is climate change to people in: (a) other countries, (b) people in the United States, (c) you or your family, and (d) your local community. Because response patterns to these items did not differ (though climate change was(More)
The Dunning-Kruger effect refers to the observation that the incompetent are often ill-suited to recognize their incompetence. Here we investigated potential Dunning-Kruger effects in high-level reasoning and, in particular, focused on the relative effectiveness of metacognitive monitoring among particularly biased reasoners. Participants who made the(More)
BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES It has been proposed that delusional beliefs are attempts to explain anomalous experiences. Why, then, do anomalous experiences induce delusions in some people but not in others? One possibility is that people with delusions have reasoning biases that result in them failing to reject implausible candidate explanations for anomalous(More)
Ellen Peters contributed to the review of Aleksandr Sinayev Sinayev and Peters (2015; hereafter S&P) present two competing hypotheses to explain performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). They dub the first the " Cognitive Reflection Hypothesis " and attribute it to other researchers: " Each of these researchers assumes that differences in CRT(More)