Learn More
Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that(More)
Combining a strategy model, an inference procedure and a new experimental design, we map sequences of observed actions in repeated games to unobserved strategies that reflect decision-makers' plans. We demonstrate the method by studying two institutional settings with distinct theoretical predictions. We find that almost all strategies inferred are best(More)
There is a good deal of miscommunication among experimenters and theorists about how to evaluate a theory that can be rejected by sufficient data, but may nevertheless be a useful approximation. A standard experimental design reports whether a general theory can be rejected on an informative test case. This paper, in contrast, reports an experiment designed(More)
Most game theory experiments are built around a single game, well chosen to provide a test of a specific theoretical prediction. Experiments concerned with testing the predictions of minimax behavior in two-person zero sum games have followed this path. The present paper uses a novel experimental design, better suited to investigating the regularities with(More)
It is not always clear how leading theories of human behavior can be used to derive quantitative predictions. Often they are stated with enough qualifications about the applicable domain so that authors might be well advised to supply a 1-800 number for perplexed readers to call when they want to know how a particular theory applies to a novel problem. To(More)
Although it is well known that trust and trustworthiness (i.e., the fulfillment of trust) are important behaviors for the fulfillment of incomplete contracts, less is known about how the economic environment influences them. In this paper we design an experiment to examine how exogenously determined (stochastic) past relationship lengths affect trust and(More)
Green [Int. J. Forecasting (2002)] reports that in certain settings predictions made by game theorists can be outperformed by the outcome of a short role playing exercise. Goodwin [Int. J. Forecasting (2002)] argues that this does not imply that game theoretic analysis cannot be useful. The current paper discusses two types of observations that support this(More)
  • 1