Learn More
Traditional accounts of sequential behavior assume that schemas and goals play a causal role in the control of behavior. In contrast, M. Botvinick and D. C. Plaut argued that, at least in routine behavior, schemas and goals are epiphenomenal. The authors evaluate the Botvinick and Plaut account by contrasting the simple recurrent network model of Botvinick(More)
The past 25 years have witnessed an increasing awareness of the importance of cognitive control in the regulation of complex behavior. It now sits alongside attention, memory, language, and thinking as a distinct domain within cognitive psychology. At the same time it permeates each of these sibling domains. This introduction reviews recent work on(More)
The development of analogical reasoning has traditionally been understood in terms of theories of adult competence. This approach emphasizes structured representations and structure mapping. In contrast, we argue that by taking a developmental perspective, analogical reasoning can be viewed as the product of a substantially different cognitive ability -(More)
Action selection in everyday goal-directed tasks of moderate complexity is known to be subject to breakdown following extensive frontal brain injury. A model of action selection in such tasks is presented and used to explore three hypotheses concerning the origins of action disorganisation: that it is a consequence of reduced top-down excitation within a(More)
Automatic imitation or "imitative compatibility" is thought to be mediated by the mirror neuron system and to be a laboratory model of the motor mimicry that occurs spontaneously in naturalistic social interaction. Imitative compatibility and spatial compatibility effects are known to depend on different stimulus dimensions-body movement topography and(More)
Two views on the semantics of concrete words are that their core mental representations are feature-based or are reconstructions of sensory experience. We argue that neither of these approaches is capable of representing the semantics of abstract words, which involve the representation of possibly hypothetical physical and mental states, the binding of(More)
We consider approaches to explanation within the cognitive sciences that begin with Marr's computational level (e.g., purely Bayesian accounts of cognitive phenomena) or Marr's implementational level (e.g., reductionist accounts of cognitive phenomena based only on neural-level evidence) and argue that each is subject to fundamental limitations which impair(More)
There are relatively few explicit accounts detailing hypothesized mechanisms underlying executive functions. To understand the processes involved in problem solving at different stages in cognitive ability, we argue a mechanistic account is necessary. This paper outlines two initial computational models that simulate separately the performance of 3-4 year(More)