Richard McKelvey

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This paper studies the ability of nonmarket institutions to invest optimally in forward intergenerational goods (FIGs), such as education and the environment, when agents are sel sh or exhibit paternalistic altruism. We show that backward intergenerational goods (BIGs), such as social security, play a crucial role in sustaining investment in FIGs: without(More)
Biologists and economists have analyzed populations where each individual interacts with randomly selected individuals. The random matching generates a very complicated stochastic system. Consequently biologists and economists have approximated such a system with a deterministic system. The justitication for such an approximation is that the population is(More)
If n points are sampled independently from an absolutely continuous distribution with support a convex subset of 2 , then the center and radius of the ball determined by the bounding median lines (the LP yolk) converge with probability one to the center and radius of the yolk. The linear program of [McKelvey (1986] is therefore an effective heuristic for(More)
This paper reports the rst experimental study of the serial and the average cost pricing mechanism under three diierent treatments: a complete information treatment and two treatments designed to simulate distributed systems like the internet with extremely limited information, synchronous and asynchronous moves. Under the complete information treatment(More)
participants at Caltech and Minnesota are greatly appreciated. The financial support of the Haynes Memorial Fellowship and Industrial Relations Center Fellowship are greatly appreciated. Email: Abstract I examine the implementation of core allocations when agents are differently informed. A one state deviation principle (an allocation cannot be improved at(More)
In a common agency game, several principals try to in°uence the behavior of an agent. Common agency games typically have multiple equilibria. One class of equilibria, called truthful, has been identi¯ed by Bernheim and Whinston and has found widespread use in the political economy literature. In this paper we identify another class of equilibria, which we(More)
There exists a large literature on two-person bargaining games and distribution games (or divide-the-dollar games) under simple majority rule, where in equilibrium a minimal winning coalition takes full advantage over everyone else. Here we extend the study to an n-person veto game where players take turns proposing policies in an n-dimensional policy space(More)
1 We examine legislative policy making in institutions with two empirically relevant features: agenda setting occurs in real time and the default policy evolves. We demonstrate that these institutions select Condorcet winners when they exist, provided a sufficient number of individuals have opportunities to make proposals. In policy spaces with either pork(More)