Richard J. Arend

Learn More
We model the two-Wrm alliance as an iterated prisoners’ dilemma game with an exit option and test several theoretical predictions over two experimental studies. A new major eVect on alliance performance arises by including the exit option (i.e., the option to end the alliance and receive a Wxed payoV that is less than the payoV for mutual cooperation but(More)
Nearly half of all strategic alliances fail (Park and Russo, 1996; Dyer et al., 2001), often because of opportunistic behavior by one party or the other. We use a tournament and simulation to study strategies in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma game with exit option to shed light on how a firm should react to an opportunistic partner. Our results indicate(More)
We continue the conversation in SO! about possible beneficial relationships between the fields of entrepreneurship and strategic organization, consistent with SO!’s ambition of reducing the distances currently separating fields that share research phenomena (Baum et al., 2003). We do so with a focus on how entrepreneurship (ENT) – as a field with a central(More)
Technological innovation drives economic growth, and the pioneering activity of scientists and engineers produce technological innovation. We provide a mathematical model of pioneering strategic choice by adopting a perspective familiar to microeconomics, but less common in the engineering management literature. Instead of focusing on the specific features(More)
  • 1