Richard Holton

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Kant argued that we have no knowledge of things in themselves, no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of things, a thesis that is not idealism but epistemic humility. David Lewis agrees (in `Ramseyan Humility'), but for Ramseyan reasons rather than Kantian. I compare the doctrines of Ramseyan and Kantian humility, and argue that Lewis's contextualist(More)
The possibilities we consider or eliminate in inquiry are epistemic possibilities. This dissertation is mainly about what it is to say or believe that something is possible in this sense. Chapter 1 ('Epistemic Contradictions') describes a new puzzle about epistemic modals and uses it to explore their logic and semantics. Chapter 2 ('Nonfactualism about(More)
At least since the middle of the twentieth century, philosophers have tended to identify weakness of will with akrasia—i.e. acting, or having a disposition to act, contrary to one ̳s judgments about what is best for one to do. However, there has been some recent debate about whether this captures the ordinary notion of weakness of will. Richard Holton(More)
Richard Holton has developed a view of the nature of weak-willed actions, and I have done the same for akratic actions. How well does this view of mine fare in the sphere of weakness of will? Considerably better than Holton’s view. That is a thesis of this article. The article’s aim is to clarify the nature of weak-willed actions.
I do not agree that this is the untutored view. Whenever I have asked non-philosophers what they take weakness of will to consist in, they have said things like this: weak-willed people are irresolute; they don’t persist in their intentions; they are too easily deflected from the path that they have chosen. My aim in this paper is to pursue this line of(More)
In this paper, we contend that the psychology of addiction is similar to the psychology of ordinary, non-addictive temptation in important respects, and explore the ways in which these parallels can illuminate both addiction and ordinary action. The incentive salience account of addiction proposed by Robinson and Berridge (1-3) entails that addictive(More)
I want to discuss a certain argument for the claim that definite descriptions are ambiguous between a Russellian quantificational interpretation and a predicational interpretation.1 The argument is found in James McCawley’s (1981) book Everything Linguists Have Always Wanted to Know about Logic (but were ashamed to ask). The argument has also been(More)
In his late paper ‘General Propositions and Causality’, Ramsey argues that unrestricted universal generalisations such as ‘All men are mortal’ are not genuine propositions.1 About this, as about much else in that paper, Ramsey had recently changed his mind. A few years earlier, both in ‘Facts and Propositions’ and in ‘Mathematical Logic’, he had argued that(More)