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Accounting Information, Disclosure, and the Cost of Capital
In this paper we examine whether and how accounting information about a firm manifests in its cost of capital, despite the forces of diversification. We build a model that is consistent with theExpand
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Contracting theory and accounting
This paper reviews agency theory and its application to accounting issues. I discuss the formulation of models of incentive problems caused by moral hazard and adverse selection problems. I reviewExpand
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The Structure and Performance Consequences of Equity Grants to Employees of New Economy Firms
The paper examines the determinants and performance consequences of equity grants to senior-level executives, lower-level managers, and non-exempt employees of "new economy" firms. We find that manyExpand
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF ACCOUNTING AND MARKET MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE IN EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION CONTRACTS
Prior research has provided useful insights into the structure of compensation plans and their incentive effects.' However, one important limitation of these studies is the virtual absence of anyExpand
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Information Asymmetry, Information Precision, and the Cost of Capital
The consequences of information differences across investors in capital markets are still much debated. This paper examines the relation between information differences across investors and the costExpand
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The information content of security prices
Abstract The study derives a relationship between prices changes and earnings changes by expanding the information upon which earnings expectations are conditioned to include data other than priorExpand
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Balancing Performance Measures
TLDR
We show that an increase in the sensitivity of a performance measure to an agent's action does not necessarily increase the weight placed on that performance measure, even if that measure is perfectly congruent with the firm's outcome. Expand
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The Structure of Organizational Incentives
0 The financial support of Peat Marwick Main & Co., Ernst & Young, David Hauck, and the Reginald H. Jones Center for Management Policy, Strategy, and Organization is gratefully acknowledged. We wouldExpand
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Executive Stock Option Plans and Corporate Dividend Policy
This paper examines the association between the initial adoption of stock options for senior-level executives and subsequent changes in corporate dividend policy. The primary research hypothesis isExpand
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Executive Effort and Selection of Risky Projects
This article examines the incentives of executives to adopt risky projects. The agency problem considered is that of motivating the executive to expend effort to generate information about theExpand
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