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In the recent years, many formalizations of security properties have been proposed, most of which are based on different underlying models and are consequently difficult to compare. A classification of security properties is thus of interest for understanding the relationships among different definitions and for evaluating the relative merits. In this(More)
Several information ow security deenitions, proposed in the literature, are generalized and adapted to the model of labelled transition systems. This very general model has been widely used as a semantic domain for many process algebras , e.g. CCS. As a by-product, we provide a process algebra similar to CCS with a set of security notions, hence relating(More)
Some of the non interference properties studied in [4, 6, 18] for information flow analysis in computer systems , notably AEAEAE, are reformulated here in a real-time setting. This is done by enhancing the Security Process Algebra of [6, 10] with some extra constructs to model real-time systems (in a discrete time setting); and then by studying the natural(More)
—In previous work, we have studied some nonin-terference properties for information flow analysis in computer systems on classic (possibilistic) labeled transition systems. In this paper, some of these properties, notably bisimulation-based nondeducibility on compositions (BNDC), are reformulated in a real-time setting. This is done by first enhancing the(More)
Secure communication in distributed systems is notoriously hard to achieve due to the variety of attacks an adversary can mount, based on message interception, modification, redirection, eavesdropping or, even more subtly, on traffic analysis. In the literature on process calculi, traditional solutions to the problem either draw on low-level cryptographic(More)