• Publications
  • Influence
Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence Across Countries
The relationship between decentralization of government activities and the extent of rent extraction by private parties is an important element in the recent debate on institutional design. TheExpand
Are Corruption and Taxation Really Harmful to Growth? Firm-Level Evidence
Exploiting a unique data set containing information about the estimated bribe payments of Ugandan firms, the authors study the relationship between bribe payments, taxes, and firm growth in UgandaExpand
Do Stronger Intellectual Property Rights Increase International Technology Transfer? Empirical Evidence from U.S. Firm-Level Panel Data
One of the alleged benefits of the recent global movement to strengthen intellectual property rights (IPRs) is that such reforms accelerate transfers of technology between countries. The paperExpand
Trade Credit, Financial Intermediary Development and Industry Growth
Recent work suggests that financial development is important for economic growth, since financial markets more effectively allocate capital to firms with high value projects. For firms in poorlyExpand
Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets
We study cultural norms and legal enforcement in controlling corruption by analyzing the parking behavior of United Nations officials in Manhattan. Until 2002, diplomatic immunity protected UNExpand
Individual Preferences for Giving
We utilize graphical representations of Dictator Games which generate rich individual- level data. Our baseline experiment employs budget sets over feasible payoff- pairs. We test these data forExpand
Cultural Proximity and Loan Outcomes
We present evidence that shared codes, religious beliefs, ethnicity - cultural proximity - between lenders and borrowers improves the efficiency of credit allocation. We identify in-groupExpand
Does Competition Encourage Credit Provision? Evidence from African Trade Credit Relationships
Previous work has claimed that monopoly power facilitates the provision of credit, because monopolists are better able to enforce payment. Here, we argue that if relationship-specific investments areExpand
Financial Dependence and Growth Revisited
In this note, we revisit an earlier, highly influential paper on Financial Dependence and Growth by Rajan and Zingales (1998), by re-examining their assumptions, and the robustness of their resultsExpand
Tax-Exempt Lobbying: Corporate Philanthropy as a Tool for Political Influence
We explore the role of charitable giving as a means of political influence, a channel that has been heretofore unexplored in the political economy literature. For philanthropic foundations associatedExpand