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- William H. Sandholm, Emin Dokumaci, Ratul Lahkar
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2008

We investigate a variety of connections between the projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic. At interior population states, the standard microfoundations for the replicator dynamic can be converted into foundations for the projection dynamic by replacing imitation of opponents with " revision driven by insecurity " and direct choice of alternative… (More)

- Ratul Lahkar, William H. Sandholm
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2008

The projection dynamic is an evolutionary dynamic for population games. It is derived from a model of individual choice in which agents abandon their current strategies at rates inversely proportional to the strategies' current levels of use. The dynamic admits a simple geometric definition, its rest points coincide with the Nash equilibria of the… (More)

- Ratul Lahkar, Robert M. Seymour
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2013

Every population game defines a vector field on the set of strategy distributions X. The projection dynamic maps each population game to a new vector field: namely, the one closest to the payoff vector field among those that never point outward from X. We investigate the geometric underpinnings of the projection dynamic, describe its basic game-theoretic… (More)

- Ratul Lahkar
- J. Economic Theory
- 2011

We examine whether price dispersion is an equilibrium phenomenon or a cyclical phenomenon. We develop a finite strategy model of price dispersion based on the infinite strategy model of Burdett and Judd (1983). Adopting an evolutionary standpoint, we examine the stability of dispersed price equilibrium under perturbed best response dynamics. We conclude… (More)

- Ratul Lahkar
- 2007

We define the logit dynamic in the space of probability measures for a game with a compact and continuous strategy set. The original Burdett and Judd (1983) model of price dispersion comes under this framework. We then show that if the payoff functions of the game satisfy Lipschitz continuity under the strong topology in the space of signed measures, the… (More)

We study the evolution of mixed strategies in population games. At any time, the distribution of mixed strategies over agents in a population is described by a density function. A pair of players is chosen randomly in each round of the game. After each round, players update their mixed strategies using certain reinforcement driven rules. The distribution… (More)

We study an evolutionary model in which strategy revision protocols are based on agent specific characteristics rather than wider social characteristics. We assume that agents are primed to play a mixed strategy, with the weights on each pure strategy modifiable on the basis of experience. At any time, the distribution of mixed strategies over agents in a… (More)

- Ratul Lahkar, Robert M. Seymour
- J. Economic Theory
- 2014

We consider reinforcement learning in games with both positive and negative payoffs. The Cross rule is the prototypical reinforcement learning rule in games that have only positive payoffs. We extend this rule to incorporate negative payoffs to obtain the generalized reinforcement learning rule. Applying this rule to a population game, we obtain the… (More)

- Ratul Lahkar, Frank Riedel
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2015