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- Ratul Lahkar, Frank Riedel
- 2014

We define the logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy spaces and establish its fundamental properties , i.e. the existence, uniqueness and continuity of solutions. We apply the dynamic to the analysis of the Burdett and Judd (1983) model of price dispersion. Our objective is to assess the stability of the logit equilibrium corresponding to the… (More)

- William H. Sandholm, Emin Dokumaci, Ratul Lahkar
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2008

We investigate a variety of connections between the projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic. At interior population states, the standard microfoundations for the replicator dynamic can be converted into foundations for the projection dynamic by replacing imitation of opponents with “revision driven by insecurity” and direct choice of alternative… (More)

- Ratul Lahkar, William H. Sandholm
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2008

The projection dynamic is an evolutionary dynamic for population games. It is derived from a model of individual choice in which agents abandon their current strategies at rates inversely proportional to the strategies’ current levels of use. The dynamic admits a simple geometric definition, its rest points coincide with the Nash equilibria of the… (More)

- Ratul Lahkar
- 2006

Every population game defines a vector field on the set of strategy distributions X. The projection dynamic maps each population game to a new vector field: namely, the one closest to the payoff vector field among those that never point outward from X. We investigate the geometric underpinnings of the projection dynamic, describe its basic game-theoretic… (More)

- Ratul Lahkar
- J. Economic Theory
- 2011

We examine whether price dispersion is an equilibrium phenomenon or a cyclical phenomenon. We develop a finite strategy model of price dispersion based on the infinite strategy model of Burdett and Judd (1983). Adopting an evolutionary standpoint, we examine the stability of dispersed price equilibrium under perturbed best response dynamics. We conclude… (More)

- Ratul Lahkar, Robert M. Seymour
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2013

- Ratul Lahkar
- 2007

We define the logit dynamic in the space of probability measures for a game with a compact and continuous strategy set. The original Burdett and Judd (1983) model of price dispersion comes under this framework. We then show that if the payoff functions of the game satisfy Lipschitz continuity under the strong topology in the space of signed measures, the… (More)

We study an evolutionary model in which strategy revision protocols are based on agent specific characteristics rather than wider social characteristics. We assume that agents are primed to play mixed strategies. At any time, the distribution of mixed strategies over agents in a population is described by a probability measure. In each round, a pair of… (More)

a r t i c l e i n f o The expansion of microfinance has triggered concerns of rising indebtedness, and higher default and interest rates. Using a screening model, we show that even if interest and default rates increase due to expansion, borrower welfare may improve. This is because: (i) all borrowers previously denied credit can obtain loans, and (ii)… (More)

- Ratul Lahkar
- Dynamic Games and Applications
- 2017