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The working papers are a series of manuscripts in their draft form. Please do not quote without obtaining the author's consent as these works are in their draft form. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and not necessarily endorsed by the School. Abstract In a principal-agent environment with moral hazard, when contracting occurs after(More)
We examine a principal-agent model with moral hazard in which, after contracting, the principal receives a signal correlated with the technology. We call this ex ante contracting and examine the value of information both when the principal has private information and when information is public. We show that: (i) the principal prefers private information to(More)
This paper studies imperfectly discriminatory contest with endogenous and stochastic entry , and its optimal (e¤ort-maximizing) design. A …xed pool of potential bidders strategically decide whether to sink an entry cost and then vie for an indivisible prize. Applying Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), we establish the existence of symmetric equilibrium in this(More)
A recurring puzzle in bargaining experiments is that individuals under–respond to changes in their bargaining position, compared to the predictions of standard bargaining theories. This result has been observed in a variety of settings, but there has been little systematic study of the factors associated with higher or lower responsiveness. We conduct a(More)
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