Randolph Sloof

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This paper reports the findings of a meta-analysis of 37 papers with 75 results from ultimatum game experiments. We find that on average the proposer offers 40% of the pie to the responder. This share is smaller for larger pie sizes and larger when a strategy method is used or when subjects are inexperienced. On average 16% of the offers is rejected. The(More)
One of the main findings of a large body of gift exchange experiments is that in an incomplete contracts environment workers on average do not shirk and usually provide more than the minimum enforceable effort level. In general, 40 to 60 percent of the workers reward higher wages with higher effort. These results are observed for simple one-employer −(More)
The Effect of Early Entrepreneurship Education: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment The aim of this study is to analyze the effectiveness of early entrepreneurship education. To this end, we conduct a randomized field experiment to evaluate a leading entrepreneurship education program that is taught worldwide in the final grade of primary school. We(More)
Standard economic theory predicts that firms will not invest in general training and will underinvest in specific training. Empirical evidence indicates, however, that firms do invest in general training of their workers. Evidence from laboratory experiments points to less underinvestment in specific training than theory predicts. We propose a simple model(More)
Performance Measurement, Expectancy and Agency Theory: An Experimental Study Theoretical analyses of (optimal) performance measures are typically performed within the realm of the linear agency model. This model implies that, for a given compensation scheme, the agent’s optimal effort is unrelated to the amount of noise in the performance measure. In(More)
In this laboratory experiment we study the use of strategic ignorance to delegate real authority within a firm. A worker can gather information on investment projects, while a manager makes the implementation decision. The manager can monitor the worker. This allows her to exploit any information gathered by the worker, but also reduces the worker’s(More)
We investigate a noisy signaling game, in which nature adds random noise to the (costly) message chosen. Theoretically, with an unfavorable prior the separating equilibrium vanishes for low noise. It reappears for intermediate levels of noise, where messages increase with noise. A pooling equilibrium always exists. In our experiment, noise works as an(More)
Breach remedies serve an important role in protecting relationship-specific investments. The theoretical literature predicts that some commonly used types of breach remedies may protect too well, in the sense that they induce overinvestment. The driving forces behind this result are the complete insurance against potential separation that breach remedies(More)