Ramon Casadesus-Masanell

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This paper analyzes a dynamic mixed duopoly in which a profit-maximizing competitor interacts with a competitor that prices at zero (or marginal cost), with the cumulation of output affecting their relative positions over time. The modeling effort is motivated by interactions between Linux, an open-source operating system, and Microsoft’s Windows in the(More)
This paper provides an axiomatic foundation for a maxmin expected utility over a set of priors (MMEU) decision rule in an environment where the elements of choice are Savage acts. This characterization complements the original axiomatization of MMEU developed in a lottery-acts (or Anscombe Aumann) framework by I. Gilboa and D. Schmeidler (1989, J. Math.(More)
We analyze the optimal strategy of a high-quality incumbent that faces a low-quality adsponsored competitor. In addition to competing through adjustments of tactical variables such as price or advertising intensity, we allow the incumbent to consider changes in its business model. We consider four alternative business models, two pure models(More)
The literature on auctions holds the view that collusive bidding in auctions harm the seller. Our purpose in this paper is to explore if cooperation among buyers can actually benefit the seller in auction-like environments in which the sale of the object confers a benefit to all potential bidders. There is a large class of auctions that admit such(More)
E-mail: jems@nwu.edu. This article is a revision of a March 1999 working paper. I thank Jim Anton, Gary Biglaiser, Ramon Casadesus-Masanell, Johannes Moenius, and Dennis Yao for helpful suggestions. I thank Ofer Azar for valuable research assistance. I also thank seminar participants at West Point, the University of Arizona, Yale School of Management,(More)
In Cournot’s model of complements, the producers of A andB are both monopolists. This paper extends Cournot’s model to allow for competition between complements on one side of the market. Consider two complements, A and B, where the A + B bundle is valuable only when purchased together. Good A is supplied by a monopolist (e.g., Microsoft) and there is(More)
I present a model to assess the extent to which recommender systems can account for the ‘long tail’, an increase in the tail of the sales distribution. Consumers face a search problem within a pool of horizontally di¤erentiated products supplied by a monopolist. They are endowed with a taste pro…le that determines their probability of matching with any(More)
We study sponsor-based business model innovations where a firm monetizes its product through sponsors rather than setting prices to its customer base. We analyze strategic interactions between an innovative entrant and an incumbent where the incumbent may imitate the entrant’s business model innovation once it is revealed. We find that an entrant needs to(More)