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- Ezra EINY, Ori HAIMANKO, Ram ORZACH, Aner SELA
- 2001

We study a class of common-value second-price auctions with differential information. This class of common-value auctions is characterized by the property that each player’s information set is connected with respect to the common value. We show that the entire class is dominance solvable, and that there is a natural single-valued selection from the… (More)

We reexamine the role of prices and advertising expenditures as signals of quality. Consumers are either “fastidious” or “indifferent.” Fastidious individuals value high quality more and low quality less than do indifferent individuals. Then a sensible and robust separating equilibrium exists in which both types set their full-information prices. However,… (More)

- David A. Malueg, Ram Orzach
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2012

- Ezra Einy, Mridu Prabal Goswami, Ori Haimanko, Ram Orzach, Aner Sela
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2017

- Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko, Ram Orzach, Aner Sela
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2002

In a general model of common-value second-price auctions with differential information, we show equivalence between the following characteristics of a bidder: (i) having a dominant strategy; (ii) possessing superior information; (iii) being immune from winner’s curse. When a dominant strategy exists, it is given by the conditional expectation of the common… (More)

- Ram Orzach, Yair Tauman
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2005

Following Spence, this note provides an education signaling model to explain the phenomenon of gifted entrepreneurs who acquire less education than ordinary individuals. Two types of individuals, ordinary and gifted, are considered. Each one of them can either convince an investor to fund his enterprise or approach a competitive job market. The probability… (More)

- Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko, Ram Orzach, Aner Sela
- 2000

We study a general model of common-value second-price auctions with differential information. We show that one of the bidders has an information advantage over the other bidders if and only if he possesses a dominant strategy. A dominant strategy is, in fact, unique, and is given by the conditional expectation of the common value with respect to his… (More)

- Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko, Ram Orzach, Aner Sela
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2016

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