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We define trust-based mechanism design as an augmentation of traditional mechanism design in which agents take into account the degree of trust that they have in their counterparts when determining their allocations. To this end, we develop an efficient, individually rational, and incentive compatible mechanism based on trust. This mechanism is embedded in(More)
— This paper reports on the design and comparison of two economically-inspired mechanisms for task allocation in environments where sellers have finite production capacities and a cost structure composed of a fixed overhead cost and a constant marginal cost. Such mechanisms are required when a system consists of multiple self-interested stakeholders that(More)
This paper develops new algorithms for coalition formation within multi-sensor networks tasked with performing wide-area surveillance. Specifically, we cast this application as an instance of coalition formation, with overlapping coalitions. We show that within this application area sub-additive coalition valuations are typical, and we thus use this(More)
This paper reports on the development of a utility-based mechanism for managing sensing and communication in cooperative multi-sensor networks. The specific application considered is that of GLACSWEB, a deployed system that uses battery-powered sensors to collect environmental data related to glaciers which it transmits back to a base station so that it can(More)
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms are often used to allocate tasks to selfish and rational agents. VCG mechanisms are incentive compatible, direct mechanisms that are efficient (i.e., max-imise social utility) and individually rational (i.e., agents prefer to join rather than opt out). However , an important assumption of these mechanisms is that the(More)
We develop a novel bidding strategy that software agents can use to buy and sell goods in Continuous Double Auctions (CDAs). Our strategy involves the agent forming a bid or ask by assessing the degree of risk involved and making a prediction about the competitive equilibrium that is likely to be reached in the marketplace. We benchmark our strategy against(More)
Conventional centralised information fusion and control architectures will be challenged by developments in sensor networks that allow sophisticated autonomous sensors, owned by different stake-holders with individual goals, to interact and share information. Given this, we advocate the use of tools and techniques from computational mechanism design (CMD),(More)
We derive optimal bidding strategies for a global bidding agent that participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We first consider a model where all other bidders are local and participate in a single auction. For this case, we prove that, assuming free disposal, the global bidder should always place non-zero bids(More)
In this paper, we present our investigation into the use of a team of players within a noisy Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) tournament. We show that the members of such a team are able to use a prearranged sequence of moves that they make at the start of each interaction in order to recognise one another, and that by coordinating their actions they can(More)