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  • Jeremy C Stein, Ulf Axelson, Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Luis Garicano, Rob Gertner, Rick Green +4 others
  • 2002
This paper asks how well different organizational structures perform in terms of generating information about investment projects and allocating capital to these projects. A decentralized approach—with small, single-manager firms—is most likely to be attractive when information about projects is " soft " and cannot be credibly transmitted. In contrast,(More)
  • Gregor Andrade, Steven N Kaplan, Ed Altman, Douglas Baird, Ken Froot, Robert Gertner +8 others
  • 1997
This paper studies thirty-one highly leveraged transactions (HLTs) of the 1980s that subsequently become financially distressed. At the time of distress, all sample firms have operating margins that are positive and in the majority of cases greater than the median for the industry. Therefore, we consider these firms largely financially distressed, not(More)
We present a model of mergers and acquisitions based on stock market misvaluations of the combining firms. The key ingredients of the model are the relative valuations of the merging firms and the market's perception of the synergies from the combination. The model explains who acquires whom, the choice of the medium of payment, the valuation consequences(More)
  • Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W Vishny, Lucian Bebchuk, Mihir Desai +12 others
  • 1999
This paper outlines and tests two agency models of dividends. According to the " outcome " model, dividends are the result of effective pressure by minority shareholders to force corporate insiders to disgorge cash. According to the " substitute " model, insiders interested in issuing equity in the future choose to pay dividends to establish a reputation(More)
  • John Boquist, Bart Hamilton, Joe Haubrich, Craig Holden, Kevin Murphy, Canice Prendergast +7 others
  • 2002
I develop a theory of stock-based compensation contracts for the chief executive officers (CEOs) of firms and confront the theoretical predictions with recent CEO compensation data. The model characterizes the optimal contract for a CEO whose reputation evolves as signals of the executive's ability are observed by shareholders. Using various proxies for CEO(More)
  • Graciela L Kaminsky, Carmen M Reinhart, Carlos A Végh, Peter Benczur, Mark Gertler, Gita Gopinath +11 others
All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. ABSTRACT Based on a sample of 104 countries, we document four key stylized facts regarding the interaction between capital flows, fiscal policy, and monetary policy.(More)
  • Antoinette Schoar, Steve Kaplan, Raghu Rajan, Sherwin Rosen ~chairman, Luigi, Judy Chevalier +7 others
  • 2002
Using plant-level observations from the Longitudinal Research Database I show that conglomerates are more productive than stand-alone firms at a given point in time. Dynamically, however, firms that diversify experience a net reduction in productivity. While the acquired plants increase productivity, incumbent plants suffer. Moreover, stock prices track(More)
  • Nicola Cetorelli, Michele Gambera, Judy Chevalier, Gary Gorton, Norman Loayza, Leonard Nakamura +13 others
  • 2000
This paper explores the empirical relevance of banking market structure on growth. There is substantial evidence of a positive relationship between the level of development of the banking sector of an economy and its long-run output growth. Little is known, however, about the role played by the market structure of the banking sector on the dynamics of(More)
  • Jeremy C Stein, Judy Chevalier, Oliver Hart, Bengt Holmstrom, Steve Kaplan, Owen Lamont +4 others
  • 2001
This essay surveys the body of research that asks how the efficiency of corporate investment is influenced by problems of asymmetric information and agency. I organize the material around two basic questions. First, does the external capital market channel the right amount of money to each firm? That is, does the market get across-firm allocations right, so(More)