Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel

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We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which first-order stochastically dominates the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions, in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more(More)
Does gender play a role in the context of team work? Our results based on a real-e¤ort experiment suggest that performance depends on the composition of the team. We …nd that female and male performance di¤er most in mixed teams with revenue sharing between the team members, as men put in signi…cantly more e¤ort than women. The data also indicate that women(More)
The conventional wisdom in the auction design literature is that first price sealed bid auctions tend to make more money while ascending auctions tend to be more efficient. We reexamine these issues in an environment in which bidders are allowed to endogenously choose in which auction format to participate. Our findings are that more bidders choose to enter(More)
When conducting electronic auctions, sellers obviously wish to maximize their revenue and one tool economic theory suggests they might use is an entry fee. By charging bidders a certain amount for entering an auction, the seller can theoretically extract more surplus from those bidders that choose to enter the auction. The problem a seller faces is that the(More)
In most cases authors are permitted to post their version of the article (e.g. in Word or Tex form) to their personal website or institutional repository. Authors requiring further information regarding Elsevier's archiving and manuscript policies are encouraged to visit: a b s t r a c t We study whether the gender performance gap is affected by the gender(More)
For helpful comments we thank Dorothea Kübler, Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, Axel Werwatz and the seminar participants at the Technical University of Berlin, the European Business School and the EEA conference 09. We are indebted to Kai Priesack, Wei Min Wang and Mark Henninger for research assistence and for help with conducting the experiments. We also thank(More)
Most prior theoretical and experimental work involving auction choice has assumed bidders …nd out their value after making a choice of which auction to enter. We examine whether or not bidders knowing their value prior to making a choice of which among multiple alternative auction formats to enter impacts their choice decision and/or the outcome of the(More)
1 The authors thank Charles Bellemare for his valuable suggestions and comments. We are grateful to the participants of the GEW conference in Magdeburg, the ESA European Meeting, the meeting of the European Economic Association and the Economics seminar at Carleton University for their comments. Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB(More)