Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel

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We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which first-order stochastically dominates the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions, in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more(More)
The conventional wisdom in the auction design literature is that first price sealed bid auctions tend to make more money while ascending auctions tend to be more efficient. We re-examine these issues in an environment in which bidders are allowed to endogenously choose in which auction format to participate. Our findings are that more bidders choose to(More)
When conducting electronic auctions, sellers obviously wish to maximize their revenue and one tool economic theory suggests they might use is an entry fee. By charging bidders a certain amount for entering an auction, the seller can theoretically extract more surplus from those bidders that choose to enter the auction. The problem a seller faces is that the(More)
Speaker: Prof. Dr. Urs Schweizer. — Department of Economics — University of Bonn — D-53113 Bonn, Phone: +49(0228)739220 — Fax: +49(0228)739221 * Humboldt-University of Berlin, Department of Economics, Spandauer Str. 1, D-10178 Berlin, Germany, Email: ivanova@wiwi.hu-berlin.de ** Department of Economics, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, 32306-2180,(More)
Does gender play a role in the context of team work? Our results based on a real-e¤ort experiment suggest that performance depends on the composition of the team. We …nd that female and male performance di¤er most in mixed teams with revenue sharing between the team members, as men put in signi…cantly more e¤ort than women. The data also indicate that women(More)
In this paper we introduce a new type of experiment that combines the advantages of lab and field experiments. The experiment is conducted in the lab but using an unchanged market environment from the real world. Moreover, a subset of the standard subject pool is used, containing those subjects who have experience in conducting transactions in that market(More)
In an information cascade experiment participants are confronted with artificial predecessors predicting in line with the BHW model (Bikchandani et al., 1992). Using the BDM (Becker et al., 1964) mechanism we study participants’ probability perceptions based on maximum prices for participating in the prediction game. We find increasing maximum prices the(More)