Rad Niazadeh

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For selling a single item to agents with independent but non-identically distributed values, the revenue optimal auction is complex. With respect to it, Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) showed that the approximation factor of the second-price auction with an anonymous reserve is between two and four. We consider the more demanding problem of approximating(More)
The problem of estimating a sparse channel, i.e. a channel with a few non-zero taps, appears in many fields of communication including acoustic underwater or wireless transmissions. In this paper, we have developed an algorithm based on Iterative Alternating Minimization technique which iteratively detects the location and the value of the channel taps. In(More)
For a number of problems in the theory of online algorithms, it is known that the assumption that elements arrive in uniformly random order enables the design of algorithms with much better performance guarantees than under worst-case assumptions. The quintessential example of this phenomenon is the secretary problem, in which an algorithm attempts to stop(More)
Robust adaptive signal processing methods for heterogeneous radar clutter scenarios, " Signal Adaptive detection using a low rank approximation to a data matrix, " IEEE Trans. A. Haimovich, " Asymptotic distribution of the conditional signal-to-noise ratio in an eigenanalysis-based adaptive array, " IEEE Trans. Jourdain, " " Principal component inverse "(More)
In this paper, we firstly propose an adaptive method based on the idea of Least Mean Square (LMS) algorithm and the concept of smoothed l0 (SL0) norm presented in [1] for estimation of sparse Inter Symbol Interface (ISI) channels which will appear in wireless and acoustic underwater transmissions. Afterwards, a new non-adaptive fast channel estimation(More)
Bidders often want to get as much as they can without violating constraints on what they spend. For example , advertisers seek to maximize the impressions, clicks, sales, or market share generated by their advertising , subject to budget or return-on-investment (ROI) constraints. Likewise, when bidders have no direct utility for leftover money – e.g.,(More)
A prevalent market structure in the Internet economy consists of buyers and sellers connected by a platform (such as Amazon or eBay) that acts as an intermediary and keeps a share of the revenue of each transaction. While the optimal mechanism that maximizes the intermediary's profit in such a setting may be quite complicated, the mechanisms observed in(More)
In this paper, which is an extended version of our work at LVA/ICA 2010 [1], the problem of Inter Symbol Interface (ISI) Sparse channel estimation and equalization will be investigated. We firstly propose an adaptive method based on the idea of Least Mean Square (LMS) algorithm and the concept of smoothed l 0 (SL0) norm presented in [2] for estimation of(More)
We provide a polynomial-time reduction from Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism design to Bayesian algorithm design for welfare maximization problems. Unlike prior results, our reduction achieves exact incentive compatibility for problems with multi-dimensional and continuous type spaces. The key technical barrier preventing exact incentive(More)
In complex combinatorial markets with complementary valuations, truthful auctions can yield low revenue. Core-selecting auctions attempt to boost revenue by setting prices so that no group of agents, including the auctioneer, can jointly improve their utilities by switching to a different allocation and payments. Among outcomes in the core, bidder-optimal(More)