Rachel T. A. Croson

Learn More
Using experiments, we examine whether the decision to trust a stranger in a one-shot interaction is equivalent to taking a risky bet, or if a trust decision entails an additional risk premium to balance the costs of trust betrayal. We compare a binary-choice Trust game with a structurally identical, binary-choice Risky Dictator game with good or bad(More)
Starting from an example of the Allies’ decision to feint at Calais and attack Normandy on D-Day, this paper models misrepresentation of intentions to competitors or enemies. Allowing for the possibility of bounded strategic rationality and rational players’ responses to it yields a sensible account of lying via costless, noiseless messages. In some leading(More)
One lingering puzzle is why voluntary contribu tions to public goods decline over time in experimental and real-w orld settings. We show that the decl ine of cooperation is driven by individual preferences for im perfect conditional cooperation. Many people’s desire to contribute less than oth ers, rather than changing beliefs of what others will contr(More)
Gender is rarely included as a factor in economics models. However, recent work in experimental economics, as well as in psychology and political science, suggests that gender is an important determinant of economic and strategic behavior. We examine gender differences in bargaining using the ‘‘trust game’’ introduced by Joyce Berg et al. (1995). In this(More)
A growing number of field and experimental studies in social dilemma settings focus on the institutional arrangements by which individuals are able to solve collective action problems. Important in this research is the role of reciprocity and institutions that facilitate cooperation via opportunities for monitoring, sanctioning, and rewarding others. This(More)
This paper identifies when other-regarding preferences (ORPs) such as trust, reciprocity and altruism will likely arise. We experimentally examine the influence of social distance and communication on ORPs in four countries. We demonstrate that country of origin significantly influences ORPs, but also find mixed support for the relationship between ORPs and(More)
This paper builds a theory of trust based on informal contract enforcement in social networks. In our model, network connections between individuals can be used as social collateral to secure informal borrowing. We de…ne network-based trust as the highest amount one agent can borrow from another agent, and derive a reduced-form expression for this quantity(More)
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you(More)
The in-group-out-group bias is among the most well documented and widely observed phenomenon in the social sciences. Despite its role in hiring decisions and job discrimination, negotiations, and conflict and competition between groups, economists have heretofore ignored the in-group-out-group bias. We question the universality of the bias by designing(More)