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  • Influence
CEO Turnover and Properties of Accounting Information
Multiple-performance-measure agency models predict that optimal contracts should place greater reliance on performance measures that are more precise and more sensitive to the agent's effort. WeExpand
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Implicit Contracts and the Explanatory Power of Top Executive Compensation for Future Performance
Recent research suggests that implicit incentive contracts may be based on performance measures that are observable only to the contracting parties. We derive and test implications of this insightExpand
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CEO Pay and the Lake Wobegon Effect
The "Lake Wobegon Effect," which is widely cited as a potential cause for rising CEO pay, is said to occur because no firm wants to admit to having a CEO who is below average, and so no firm allowsExpand
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Co-Worker Complementarity and the Stability of Top Management Teams
We analyze changes in the composition of top management teams when a key member of the team (the chief executive officer [CEO]) departs. We find that the probability of non-CEO top manager turnoverExpand
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Bonuses and Non-Public Information in Publicly Traded Firms
Recent research in accounting explores how firms use “individual” or “non-financial” measures of performance in executive compensation contracts. We model a firm that conditions bonus payments toExpand
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