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- Publications
- Influence
CEO Turnover and Properties of Accounting Information
- E. Engel, Rachel M. Hayes, X. Wang
- Business
- 14 May 2003
Multiple-performance-measure agency models predict that optimal contracts should place greater reliance on performance measures that are more precise and more sensitive to the agent's effort. We… Expand
Implicit Contracts and the Explanatory Power of Top Executive Compensation for Future Performance
- Rachel M. Hayes, S. Schaefer
- Economics
- 1 November 1997
Recent research suggests that implicit incentive contracts may be based on performance measures that are observable only to the contracting parties. We derive and test implications of this insight… Expand
CEO Pay and the Lake Wobegon Effect
- S. Schaefer, Rachel M. Hayes
- 11 December 2008
The "Lake Wobegon Effect," which is widely cited as a potential cause for rising CEO pay, is said to occur because no firm wants to admit to having a CEO who is below average, and so no firm allows… Expand
Co-Worker Complementarity and the Stability of Top Management Teams
- P. Oyer, S. Schaefer, Rachel M. Hayes
- Business
- 1 February 2004
We analyze changes in the composition of top management teams when a key member of the team (the chief executive officer [CEO]) departs. We find that the probability of non-CEO top manager turnover… Expand
Bonuses and Non-Public Information in Publicly Traded Firms
- Rachel M. Hayes, S. Schaefer
- Economics
- 1 December 2005
Recent research in accounting explores how firms use “individual” or “non-financial” measures of performance in executive compensation contracts. We model a firm that conditions bonus payments to… Expand