We consider the following two-period problem of self-control. In the first period, an individual has to decide on the set of feasible choices from which she will select one in the second period. In… (More)

We study the effect of communication in two-person games of incomplete information. We show that for any two-player game of incomplete information, any rational mediated communication mechanism… (More)

We consider concave and Lipschitz continuous preference functionals over monetary lotteries. We show that they possess an envelope representation, as the minimum of a bounded family of continuous… (More)

We consider a decision maker who faces dynamic decision situations that involve intertemporal tradeoffs, as in consumption-savings problems, and who experiences taste shocks that are transient… (More)

A principal contracts optimally with an agent to operate a firm over an infinite time horizon when the agent is liquidity constrained and has access to private information about the sequence of cost… (More)

We axiomatize a new class of recursive dynamic models that capture subjective constraints on the amount of information a decision maker can obtain, pay attention to, or absorb, via a Markov Decision… (More)

The main justification for cash-in-advance (CIA) equilibria when there are multiple assets is a Shapley-Shubik trading-post model where the agents coordinate on a particular medium of exchange. Of… (More)

We propose a new class of recursive dynamic models that capture subjective constraints on the amount of information a decision maker can obtain, pay attention to, or absorb, via an Information Choice… (More)

We consider agents who have a dynamic preference for flexibility, as in Krishna and Sadowski [2012] (KS). Such agents are uncertain about their future utilities. We first consider a version of the… (More)

In this supplement to Krishna and Sadowski [2013], we construct a recursive representation of choice over infinite horizon consumption problems where the decision maker’s utilities follow a… (More)