• Publications
  • Influence
Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis
This Article challenges the influential claim that primary responsibility for environmental regulation should be assigned to the federal government because public choice pathologies cause systematic
This article presents the first evidence about the choice of corporate law and the structure of the market for corporate charters at an IPO. Though firms are free to incorporate in any of the 50
Sharing Damages among Multiple Tortfeasors
In our society, losses are often caused by the activities of more than one actor. The apportionment of such losses among the various responsible actors raises difficult and controversial questions.
Global warming: Improve economic models of climate change.
Costs of carbon emissions are being underestimated, but current estimates are still valuable for setting mitigation policy, say Richard L. Revesz and colleagues.
The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy
In the realm of environmental policy instrument choice, there is great divergence between the recommendations of normative economic theory and positive political reality. Four gaps stand out. First,
A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholarship
Lee Epstein and Gary King, two distinguished social scientists, mount a forceful attack on empirical legal scholarship.1 According to Epstein and King, "the current state of empirical legal
Environmental regulation, cost-benefit analysis, and the discounting of human lives.
  • R. Revesz
  • Economics
    Columbia law review
  • 1 March 1999
The appropriateness of discounting should be resolved differently in the cases of latent harms and harms to future generations, because one needs to make intra-personal, intertemporal comparisons of utility while the other needs to define a metric against which to compare the utilities of individuals living in different generations.