R. Pitchford

Publications43
h-index13
Citations745
Highly Influential Citations30
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A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment
Privatisation in Australia: Understanding the Incentives in Public and Private Firms
Privatisation has been an important tool of government policy in Australia and overseas in the last two decades. We explain recent contributions to research in privatisation, and apply a simple…
How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk: Comment
Recently, U.S. environmental law has shown a tendency toward increased lender liability. A model of a potentially judgment-proof owner of a firm, a lender, and a potential victim is developed in…
Restructuring the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism
Sovereign defaults are time consuming and costly to resolve ex post. But these costs also improve borrowing incentives ex ante. What is the optimal tradeoff between efficient borrowing ex ante and…
The land assembly problem revisited
Coming to the Nuisance: An Economic Analysis from an Incomplete Contracts Perspective
We construct a model in which an investment opportunity arises for a first mover before it knows the identity of a second mover and in which joint location results in a negative externality.…
A model of seller holdout
Summary.We model a buyer who wishes to combine objects owned by two separate sellers in order to realize higher value. Sellers are able to avoid entering into negotiations with the buyer, so that the…
Holdouts in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory of Negotiation in a Weak Contractual Environment
Negotiations between a country in default and its international creditors are modeled as a dynamic game in an environment of weak contractual enforcement. The country cannot borrow internationally…
Holdouts in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory of Negotiation in a Weak Contractual Environment
Why is it difficult to restructure sovereign debt in a timely manner? In this paper we present a theory of the sovereign debt restructuring process in which delay arises as individual creditors…
Moral hazard and limited liability: The real effects of contract bargaining
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