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  • Influence
CEO turnover and outside succession A cross-sectional analysis
Abstract This study examines chief executive officer (CEO) turnover. It reports new evidence on factors that affect the likelihoods of voluntary and forced turnover, and for both of these turnoverExpand
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Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long-Term Perspective
We report evidence on chief executive officer (CEO) turnover during the 1971 to 1994 period. We find that the nature of CEO turnover activity has changed over time. The frequencies of forced CEOExpand
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Managerial Succession and Firm Performance
We examine CEO turnover and firm financial performance. Accounting measures of performance relative to other firms deteriorate prior to CEO turnover and improve thereafter. The degree of improvementExpand
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Outside Directors and CEO Selection
This paper documents a strong positive relation between the percentage of outside directors and the frequency of outside CEO succession. The likelihood that an executive from outside the firm isExpand
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Explicit versus Implicit Contracts: Evidence from CEO Employment Agreements
We report evidence on the determinants of whether the relationship between a firm and its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is governed by an explicit (written) or an implicit agreement. We find thatExpand
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Voting with their feet: institutional ownership changes around forced CEO turnover
Abstract We investigate whether institutional investors “vote with their feet” when dissatisfied with a firm's management by examining changes in equity ownership around forced CEO turnover. We findExpand
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Measuring Investment Distortions when Risk-Averse Managers Decide Whether to Undertake Risky Projects
This paper examines distortions in corporate investment decisions when a new project changes firm risk. It presents a dynamic model in which a self-interested, risk-averse manager makes investmentExpand
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Variation in the Monitoring Incentives of Outside Stockholders*
We examine abnormal returns around the announcement of antitakeover amendment proposals for evidence on variation in the effectiveness of monitoring by outside stockholders. The evidence suggestsExpand
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Spinoffs and wealth transfers: The Marriott case☆
This paper examines changes in bondholder and shareholder wealth resulting from the 1993 Marriott spinoff. The evidence indicates that there was a wealth transfer from the bondholders to theExpand
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Measuring investment distortions arising from stockholder-bondholder conflicts
We examine the importance of stockholder}bondholder con#icts in capital-structure choice. Numerical techniques are used to compute the expected wealth transfer between stockholders and bondholdersExpand
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