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A Continuous Dilemma âˆ
We study prisoner’s dilemmas played in continuous time with i¬‚ow payoi¬€s over 60 seconds. In most cases, the median rate of mutual cooperation rises to 90% or more. Control sessions with 8-timeExpand
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Information aggregation and manipulation in an experimental market
Prediction markets are increasingly being considered as methods for gathering, summarizing and aggregating diffuse information by governments and businesses alike. Critics worry that these marketsExpand
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Separating the Hawks from the Doves: Evidence from Continuous Time Laboratory Games
TLDR
We use a bimatrix with highly in- 2 equitable payoffs in the asymmetric pure Nash equilibria, giving half of the subjects in the two-population protocol a powerful reason to resist convergence to either predicted equilibrium. Expand
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Learning to Wait: A Laboratory Investigation
Human subjects decide when to sink a fixed cost C to seize an irreversible investment opportunity whose value V is governed by Brownian motion. The optimal policy is to invest when V first crosses aExpand
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Continuity, Inertia, and Strategic Uncertainty: A Test of the Theory of Continuous Time Games
The theory of continuous time games (Simon and Stinchcombe (1989), Bergin and MacLeod (1993)) shows that continuous time interactions can generate very different equilibrium behavior thanExpand
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From imitation to collusion: Long-run learning in a low-information environment
TLDR
We explore the stability of imitation in a 1,200-period experimental Cournot game where subjects do not know the payoff function but see the output quantities and payoffs of each oligopolist after every period. Expand
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Continuous time and communication in a public-goods experiment
We investigate the nature of continuous-time strategic interactions in public-goodsgames. In one set of treatments, four subjects make contribution decisions in continuous timewhile in another theyExpand
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Can Manipulators Mislead Market Observers
We study experimental markets where privately informed traders exchange simple assets, and where uninformed third parties are asked to forecast the values of these assets, guided only by marketExpand
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Extreme Walrasian Dynamics: The Gale Example in the Lab
We study David Gale's (1963) economy using laboratory markets. Tatonnement theory predicts prices will diverge from an equitable interior equilibrium toward infinity or zero depending only on initialExpand
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A Manipulator Can Aid Prediction Market Accuracy
Prediction markets are low volume speculative markets whose prices offer informative forecasts on particular policy topics. Observers worry that traders may attempt to mislead decision makers byExpand
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