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- Publications
- Influence
A Continuous Dilemma âˆ
- D. Friedman, R. Oprea
- Economics
- 10 September 2009
We study prisoner’s dilemmas played in continuous time with i¬‚ow payoi¬€s over 60 seconds. In most cases, the median rate of mutual cooperation rises to 90% or more. Control sessions with 8-time… Expand
Information aggregation and manipulation in an experimental market
Prediction markets are increasingly being considered as methods for gathering, summarizing and aggregating diffuse information by governments and businesses alike. Critics worry that these markets… Expand
Separating the Hawks from the Doves: Evidence from Continuous Time Laboratory Games
- R. Oprea, Keith Henwood, D. Friedman
- Economics, Computer Science
- J. Econ. Theory
- 27 July 2010
TLDR
Learning to Wait: A Laboratory Investigation
- R. Oprea, D. Friedman, Steven T. Anderson
- Economics
- 1 July 2009
Human subjects decide when to sink a fixed cost C to seize an irreversible investment opportunity whose value V is governed by Brownian motion. The optimal policy is to invest when V first crosses a… Expand
Continuity, Inertia, and Strategic Uncertainty: A Test of the Theory of Continuous Time Games
- Evan M. Calford, R. Oprea
- Mathematics
- 1 May 2017
The theory of continuous time games (Simon and Stinchcombe (1989), Bergin and MacLeod (1993)) shows that continuous time interactions can generate very different equilibrium behavior than… Expand
From imitation to collusion: Long-run learning in a low-information environment
- D. Friedman, S. Huck, R. Oprea, Simon Weidenholzer
- Economics, Computer Science
- J. Econ. Theory
- 22 July 2012
TLDR
Continuous time and communication in a public-goods experiment
- R. Oprea, G. Charness, D. Friedman
- Economics
- 1 December 2014
We investigate the nature of continuous-time strategic interactions in public-goodsgames. In one set of treatments, four subjects make contribution decisions in continuous timewhile in another they… Expand
Can Manipulators Mislead Market Observers
- R. Oprea, D. Porter, C. Hibbert, R. Hanson, Dorina Tila
- Business
- 2007
We study experimental markets where privately informed traders exchange simple assets, and where uninformed third parties are asked to forecast the values of these assets, guided only by market… Expand
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Extreme Walrasian Dynamics: The Gale Example in the Lab
- Sean M. Crockett, R. Oprea, C. Plott
- Economics
- 2 April 2010
We study David Gale's (1963) economy using laboratory markets. Tatonnement theory predicts prices will diverge from an equitable interior equilibrium toward infinity or zero depending only on initial… Expand
A Manipulator Can Aid Prediction Market Accuracy
Prediction markets are low volume speculative markets whose prices offer informative forecasts on particular policy topics. Observers worry that traders may attempt to mislead decision makers by… Expand