• Publications
  • Influence
Luminosity and the safety of knowledge
:  In his recent Knowledge and its Limits, Timothy Williamson argues that no non-trivial mental state is such that being in that state suffices for one to be in a position to know that one is in it.Expand
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McDowell and the new evil genius
Many epistemologists both internalists and externalists regard the "New Evil Genius Problem" (Lehrer & Cohen 1983) as constituting an important consideration in favour of (one or another version of)Expand
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What Evidence Do You Have?
  • R. Neta
  • Mathematics
  • The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • 1 March 2008
Your evidence constrains your rational degrees of confidence both locally and globally. On the one hand, particular bits of evidence can boost or diminish your rational degree of confidence inExpand
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Treating Something as a Reason for Action
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S Knows That P
What’s the point of trying to give an account of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a subject S to know the truth of some proposition p ~what I’ll henceforth call an “analysis” of “S knowsExpand
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Contextualism and the Problem of the External World
A skeptic claims that I do not have knowledge of the external world. It has been thought that the skeptic reaches this conclusion because she employs unusually stringent standards for knowledge. ButExpand
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Anti‐intellectualism and the Knowledge‐Action Principle
How does Stanley argue for this remarkable thesis? Stanley’s case for anti-intellectualism may appear to be an argument to the best explanation of our intuitions concerning five cases, which he callsExpand
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ON THE NORMATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF BRUTE FACTS
  • R. Neta
  • Psychology
  • Legal Theory
  • 1 September 2004
Sometimes there are reasons for us to think or act in certain ways. We pay our taxes, we show up on time for our classes, we refuse to assent to claims that we recognize to be inconsistent, and weExpand
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Contextualism and a puzzle about seeing
Contextualist solutions to skeptical puzzles have recently been subjected to various criticisms. In this paper, I will defend contextualism against an objection pressed by Jason Stanley. In theExpand
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Safety and epistemic luck
TLDR
We argue that the safety condition on knowledge is not a proper formulation of the intuition that knowledge excludes luck. Expand
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