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Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games
We investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting. Players choose strategies based on relative expected utility and assume other players do so asExpand
A statistical model for the analysis of ordinal level dependent variables
This paper develops a model, with assumptions similar to those of the linear model, for use when the observed dependent variable is ordinal. This model is an extension of the dichotomous probitExpand
Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games
This article investigates the use of standard econometric models for quantal choice to study equilibria of extensive form games. Players make choices based on a quantal-choice model and assume otherExpand
An experimental study of the centipede game
We report on an experiment in which individuals play a version of the centipede game. In this game, two players alternately get a chance to take the larger portion of a continually escalating pile ofExpand
Covering, Dominance, and Institution Free Properties of Social Choice
This paper shows that different institutional structures for aggregation of preferences under majority rule may generate social choices that are quite similar, so that the actual social choice may beExpand
Computation of equilibria in finite games
Publisher Summary This chapter provides an overview of the latest state of the art of methods for numerical computation of Nash equilibria —and refinements of Nash equilibria —for general finiteExpand
A Method of Scaling with Applications to the 1968 and 1972 Presidential Elections
TLDR
A method of scaling is proposed to estimate the positions of candidates and voters on a common issue dimension and the resulting ideal point estimates are related to candidate positions in 1968 to test a simple Downsian voting model. Expand
An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules
We present experimental results on groups facing a decision problem analogous to that faced by a jury. We consider three treatment variables: group size (three or six), number of votes needed forExpand
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