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The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules
The rich law and economics literature on contract default rules - that is, terms that govern relationships between contracting parties only if those parties do not explicitly agree to other terms -Expand
Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability
Economic theory suggests that, in most circumstances, market forces will ensure that stan-dard form contracts contain terms that are not only socially efficient but also beneficial to non-draftingExpand
Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics
As law and economics turns 40 years old, its continued vitality is threatened by its unrealistic core behavioral assumption: that people subject to the law act rationally. Professors Korobkin andExpand
Negotiation Theory and Strategy
The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis
Most legal scholarship implicitly adopts the assumption of the Coase Theorem that the value an individual places on a legal entitlement is independent of whether or not the individual has physicalExpand
Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms
Traditional law and economics analysis assumes that negotiating parties' preferences for contract terms are formed independently of legal rules and the structure of negotiations. In this article,Expand
What Comes After Victory for Behavioral Law and Economics?
The battle to separate the economic analysis of legal rules and institutions from the straightjacket of strict rational choice assumptions has been won by the proponents of behavioral law andExpand
Libertarian Welfarism
In a series of publications, Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler, and Colin Camerer et al., have proposed an approach to legal policy that encourages individuals to pursue actions that will maximize theirExpand
Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach
** Research Fellow, SCCN. B.A. 1989, Stanford; Ed.M. 1991, Harvard; J.D. 1994, Stanford. Ed. Research support for this project was provided by a generous grant from the SCCN. The authors thank RobertExpand