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Decisions from Experience and the Effect of Rare Events in Risky Choice
This work found that in the case of decisions from experience, people make choices as if they underweight the probability of rare events, and explored the impact of two possible causes of this underweighting—reliance on relatively small samples of information and overweighting of recently sampled information. Expand
The priority heuristic: making choices without trade-offs.
The priority heuristic is generalized from the framework of fast and frugal heuristics from inferences to preferences and predicts the Allais paradox, and how accurately the heuristic predicts people's choices is tested. Expand
The description–experience gap in risky choice
Converging findings show that when people make decisions based on experience, rare events tend to have less impact than they deserve according to their objective probabilities. Expand
A choice prediction competition: Choices from experience and from description
The best predictions of decisions from descriptions were obtained with a stochastic variant of prospect theory assuming that the distance to the weighted values decreases with the distance between the cumulative payoff functions. Expand
The Description-Experience Gap in Risky Choice: The Role of Sample Size and Experienced Probabilities
Risky prospects come in different forms. Sometimes options are presented with convenient descriptions summarizing outcomes and their respective likelihoods. People can thus make decisions fromExpand
Experimental practices in economics: A methodological challenge for psychologists?
There is a call for more research on the consequences of methodological preferences, such as the use on monetary payments, and a “do-it-both-ways” rule regarding the enactment of scripts, repetition of trials, and performance-based monetary payments. Expand
How forgetting aids heuristic inference.
Simulations of the recognition heuristic demonstrate that forgetting can boost accuracy by increasing the chances that only 1 object is recognized, and that loss of information aids inference heuristics that exploit mnemonic information. Expand
Grandparental investment: past, present, and future.
Although grandparents in industrialized societies continue to invest substantial amounts of time and money in their grandchildren, there is a paucity of studies investigating the influence that this investment has on grandchildren in low-risk family contexts, and a more comprehensive theoretical framework of grandparental investment is called for. Expand
On the psychology of the recognition heuristic: retrieval primacy as a key determinant of its use.
This work argues that the retrieval of subjective recognition precedes that of an objective probabilistic cue and occurs at little to no cognitive cost and gives rise to 2 predictions, both of which have been empirically supported: Inferences in line with the recognition heuristic are made faster than inferences inconsistent with it and are more prevalent under time pressure. Expand
Age differences in risky choice: a meta‐analysis
The results suggest that age‐related differences vary considerably as a function of task characteristics, in particular the learning requirements of the task. Expand