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Thoughts and Utterances: The Pragmatics of Explicit Communication
The Long Road from Linguistically Encoded Meaning to the Thought(s) Explicitly Communicated is described, from Multiple Semantic Ambiguity to Univocal Semantics and Pragmatic Enrichment.
Informativeness, relevance and scalar implicature
The main topic of this paper is the phenomenon of scalar implicature, where the choice of a weaker element from a scale of elements ordered in terms of semantic strength tends to implicate that, as far as the speaker knows, none of the stronger elements in the scale holds in this instance.
A unitary approach to lexical pragmatics: relevance, inference and ad hoc concepts.
According to recent work in the new field of lexical pragmatics, the meanings of words are frequently pragmatically adjusted and fine-tuned in context, so that their contribution to the proposition
Linguistic Meaning, Communicated Meaning and Cognitive Pragmatics
Within the philosophy of language, pragmatics has tended to be seen as an adjunct to, and a means of solving problems in, semantics. A cognitive-scientific conception of pragmatics as a mental
XIII—Metaphor: Ad Hoc Concepts, Literal Meaning and Mental Images
An account of metaphor understanding which covers the full range of cases has to allow for two routes or modes of processing, one of which requires a greater focus on the literal meaning of sentences or texts, which is metarepresented as a whole and subjected to more global, reflective pragmatic inference.
Enrichment and loosening: complementary processes in deriving the proposition expressed? Linguistisc
One important consequence of the relevance-theoretic view of cognition and communication is the following: we can think many thoughts that our language cannot encode, and we can communicate many
Relevance Theory and the saying/implicating distinction
It is argued here that, given a context-free semantics for linguistic expression types, together with the explicature/implicature distinction, there is no role for any minimally propositional notion of ‘what is said’.