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We design and analyze approximately revenue-maximizing auctions in general single-parameter settings. Bidders have publicly observable attributes, and we assume that the valuations of indistinguishable bidders are independent draws from a common distribution. Crucially, we assume all valuation distributions are a priori <i>unknown</i> to the seller. Despite… (More)

- Mohammad Mahdian, Qiqi Yan
- STOC
- 2011

In a seminal paper, Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani show that a simple ranking algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of 1-1/e for the online bipartite matching problem in the standard adversarial model, where the ratio of 1-1/e is also shown to be optimal. Their result also implies that in the random arrivals model defined by Goel and Mehta, where the online… (More)

- Qiqi Yan
- SODA
- 2011

For revenue and welfare maximization in single-dimensional Bayesian settings, Chawla et al. (STOC10) recently showed that sequential posted-price mechanisms (SPMs), though simple in form, can perform surprisingly well compared to the optimal mechanisms. In this paper, we give a theoretical explanation of this fact, based on a connection to the notion of… (More)

- Qiqi Yan
- 2006

In this paper, we first introduce a new lower bound technique for the state complexity of transformations of automata. Namely we suggest considering the class of full automata in lower bound analysis. Then we apply such technique to the complementation of nondeterministic ωautomata and obtain several lower bound results. Particularly, we prove anΩ((0.76n))… (More)

We design an expected polynomial-time, truthful-in-expectation, (1 − 1/e)-approximation mechanism for welfare maximization in a fundamental class of combinatorial auctions. Our results apply to bidders with valuations that are matroid rank sums (MRS), which encompass most concrete examples of submodular functions studied in this context, including coverage… (More)

- Qiqi Yan
- ICALP
- 2006

Vol. 4 (1:?) 2008, pp. 1–1–20 www.lmcs-online.org Submitted Jul. 25, 2007 Published Mar. ??, 2008 LOWER BOUNDS FOR COMPLEMENTATION OF ω -AUTOMATA VIA THE FULL AUTOMATA TECHNIQUE ∗ QIQI YAN Department of Computer S ien e and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, 200240, Shanghai, P.R. China e-mail address: onta t qiqiyan. om Abstra t. In this paper, we… (More)

- Shaddin Dughmi, Tim Roughgarden, Qiqi Yan
- STOC
- 2011

We design an expected polynomial time, truthful in expectation, (1-1/e)-approximation mechanism for welfare maximization in a fundamental class of combinatorial auctions. Our results apply to bidders with valuations that are <i>matroid rank sums (MRS)</i>, which encompass most concrete examples of submodular functions studied in this context, including… (More)

- Jason D. Hartline, Qiqi Yan
- EC
- 2011

We consider profit maximizing (incentive compatible) mechanism design in general environments that include, e.g., position auctions (for selling advertisements on Internet search engines) and single-minded combinatorial auctions. We analyze optimal envy-free pricings in these settings, and give economic justification for using the optimal revenue of… (More)

Most results in revenue-maximizing auction design hinge on "getting the price right" --- offering goods to bidders at a price low enough to encourage a sale, but high enough to garner non-trivial revenue. Getting the price right can be hard work, especially when the seller has little or no a priori information about bidders' valuations.
A simple… (More)

- Mukund Sundararajan, Qiqi Yan
- EC
- 2010

The existing literature on optimal auctions focuses on optimizing the <i>expected revenue</i> of the seller, and is appropriate for risk-neutral sellers. In this paper, we identify good mechanisms for <i>risk-averse</i> sellers. As is standard in the economics literature, we model the risk-aversion of a seller by endowing the seller with a monotone concave… (More)