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- Po-An Chen, Mary David, David Kempe
- EC
- 2010

In this paper, we study the vaccination of graphs against the outbreak of infectious diseases, in the following natural model generalizing a model by Aspnes et al.: An infectious disease breaks out at a random node of the graph and propagates along the edges of the graph. Vaccinated nodes cannot be infected, nor pass on the infection, whereas all other… (More)

- Po-An Chen, Bart de Keijzer, David Kempe, Guido Schäfer
- WINE
- 2011

We study the inefficiency of equilibria for various classes of games when players are (partially) altruistic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming that player i's perceived cost is a convex combination of 1 − αi times his direct cost and αi times the social cost. Tuning the parameters αi allows smooth interpolation between purely selfish and purely… (More)

- Po-An Chen, David Kempe
- EC
- 2008

In this paper, we study the price of anarchy of traffic routing, under the assumption that users are partially altruistic or spiteful. We model such behavior by positing that the "cost" perceived by a user is a linear combination of the actual latency of the route chosen (selfish component), and the increase in latency the user causes for others (altruistic… (More)

- Po-An Chen, Chi-Jen Lu
- AAMAS
- 2014

Different types of dynamics have been studied in repeated game play, and one of them which has received much attention recently consists of those based on " no-regret " algorithms from the area of machine learning. It is known that dynamics based on generic no-regret algorithms may not converge to Nash equilibria in general, but to a larger set of outcomes,… (More)

- Chia-Hung Lien, Ying-Wen Bai, Ming-Bo Lin, Po-An Chen
- Proceedings. 2004 12th IEEE International…
- 2004

An Internet server center provides multiple Web services by means of a cluster server pool. This paper presents a dynamic Web-server (DWS) architecture design for the resource management in a server cluster, with an emphasis on the proper balance of energy consumption and performance. The goals are to allocate different numbers of servers for different… (More)

- Xiaoxun Sun, William Yeoh, Po-An Chen, Sven Koenig
- AAMAS
- 2009

In this paper, we present two simple optimizations that can reduce the number of priority queue operations for A* and its extensions. Basically, when the optimized search algorithms expand a state, they check whether they will expand a successor of the state next. If so, they do not first insert it into the priority queue and then immediately remove it… (More)

- Po-An Chen, Bart de Keijzer, David Kempe, Guido Schäfer
- ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.
- 2014

We study the inefficiency of equilibria for congestion games when players are (partially) altruistic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming that player <i>i</i>'s perceived cost is a convex combination of α<sub>i</sub> times his direct cost and α<sub>i</sub> times the social cost. Tuning the parameters α<sub>i</sub> allows smooth… (More)

- Po-An Chen, David Kempe
- SAGT
- 2009

We study auctions whose bidders are embedded in a social or economic network. As a result, even bidders who do not win the auction themselves might derive utility from the auction, namely, when a friend wins. On the other hand, when an enemy or competitor wins, a bidder might derive negative utility. Such spite and altruism will alter the bidding… (More)

- Po-An Chen, Chi-Jen Lu
- AAMAS
- 2015

Almost all convergence results from each player adopting specific " no-regret " learning algorithms such as multiplica-tive updates or the more general mirror-descent algorithms in repeated games are only known in the more generous information model, in which each player is assumed to have access to the costs of all possible choices, even the unchosen ones,… (More)

We study the inefficiency of equilibria for several classes of games when players are (partially) altruistic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming that player i's perceived cost is a convex combination of 1 − α i times his direct cost and α i times the social cost. Tuning the parameters α i allows smooth interpolation between purely selfish and purely… (More)