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We study the inefficiency of equilibria for various classes of games when players are (partially) altruistic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming that player i's perceived cost is a convex combination of 1 − αi times his direct cost and αi times the social cost. Tuning the parameters αi allows smooth interpolation between purely selfish and purely(More)
Different types of dynamics have been studied in repeated game play, and one of them which has received much attention recently consists of those based on " no-regret " algorithms from the area of machine learning. It is known that dynamics based on generic no-regret algorithms may not converge to Nash equilibria in general, but to a larger set of outcomes,(More)
In this paper, we present two simple optimizations that can reduce the number of priority queue operations for A* and its extensions. Basically, when the optimized search algorithms expand a state, they check whether they will expand a successor of the state next. If so, they do not first insert it into the priority queue and then immediately remove it(More)
An Internet server center provides multiple Web services by means of a cluster sewer pool. This paper presents a Dynamic Web-Server (DWS) architecture design for the resource management in a server cluster, with an emphasis on the proper balance of energy consumption and performance. The goals are to allocate different numbers of servers for different(More)
We study the inefficiency of equilibria for congestion games when players are (partially) altruistic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming that player <i>i</i>'s perceived cost is a convex combination of &alpha;<sub>i</sub> times his direct cost and &alpha;<sub>i</sub> times the social cost. Tuning the parameters &alpha;<sub>i</sub> allows smooth(More)
We study auctions whose bidders are embedded in a social or economic network. As a result, even bidders who do not win the auction themselves might derive utility from the auction, namely, when a friend wins. On the other hand, when an enemy or competitor wins, a bidder might derive negative utility. Such spite and altruism will alter the bidding(More)