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In this paper, we study the vaccination of graphs against the outbreak of infectious diseases, in the following natural model generalizing a model by Aspnes et al.: An infectious disease breaks out at a random node of the graph and propagates along the edges of the graph. Vaccinated nodes cannot be infected, nor pass on the infection, whereas all other… (More)

We study the inefficiency of equilibria for various classes of games when players are (partially) altruistic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming that player i's perceived cost is a convex combination of 1 − αi times his direct cost and αi times the social cost. Tuning the parameters αi allows smooth interpolation between purely selfish and purely… (More)

In this paper, we present two simple optimizations that can reduce the number of priority queue operations for A* and its extensions. Basically, when the optimized search algorithms expand a state, they check whether they will expand a successor of the state next. If so, they do not first insert it into the priority queue and then immediately remove it… (More)

- Po-An Chen, David Kempe
- EC
- 2008

In this paper, we study the price of anarchy of traffic routing, under the assumption that users are partially altruistic or spiteful. We model such behavior by positing that the "cost" perceived by a user is a linear combination of the actual latency of the route chosen (selfish component), and the increase in latency the user causes for others (altruistic… (More)

Different types of dynamics have been studied in repeated game play, and one of them which has received much attention recently consists of those based on " no-regret " algorithms from the area of machine learning. It is known that dynamics based on generic no-regret algorithms may not converge to Nash equilibria in general, but to a larger set of outcomes,… (More)

We study auctions whose bidders are embedded in a social or economic network. As a result, even bidders who do not win the auction themselves might derive utility from the auction, namely, when a friend wins. On the other hand, when an enemy or competitor wins, a bidder might derive negative utility. Such spite and altruism will alter the bidding… (More)

We study the inefficiency of equilibria for congestion games when players are (partially) altruistic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming that player <i>i</i>'s perceived cost is a convex combination of α<sub>i</sub> times his direct cost and α<sub>i</sub> times the social cost. Tuning the parameters α<sub>i</sub> allows smooth… (More)

Almost all convergence results from each player adopting specific " no-regret " learning algorithms such as multiplica-tive updates or the more general mirror-descent algorithms in repeated games are only known in the more generous information model, in which each player is assumed to have access to the costs of all possible choices, even the unchosen ones,… (More)

We consider a team of agents that are required to coordinate their actions in order to maximize a global objective. Our domains are characterized by uncertainty, dynamism, and distributed information. Determining appropriate actions becomes quite difficult, especially as the number of agents and the coupling between them increases. This paper discusses five… (More)