Pieter Gautier

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In this paper, we construct an equilibrium model of directed search in a large labor market in which unemployed workers make multiple job applications. Speci…cally, we consider a matching process in which job seekers, observing the wages posted at all vacancies, send their applications to the vacancies that they …nd most attractive. At the same time, each(More)
We study a labor market where workers choose the number of jobs to apply for and firms simultaneously post a wage. There exist two types of equilibria in the market. If the cost of applying for jobs is high, workers apply for just one job and firms offer the minimum wage; this number of job applications is adequate or insufficient from a welfare viewpoint.(More)
Randomized experiments provide policy relevant treatment effects if there are no spillovers between participants and nonparticipants. We show that this assumption is violated for a Danish activation program for unemployed workers. Using a difference-in-difference model we show that the nonparticipants in the experiment regions find jobs slower after the(More)
We analyze a general search model with on-the-job search (OJS) and sorting of heterogeneous workers into heterogeneous jobs. For given values of non-market time, the relative effi ciency of OJS, and the amount of search frictions, we derive a simple relationship between the unemployment rate, mismatch and wage dispersion. We estimate the latter two from(More)
In this paper we study a large market in which sellers compete by offering auctions to buyers instead of simple fixed price contracts. Two variants of the model are studied. One extends a model first analyzed by Wolinsky (Rev. Econ. Stud. 55 (1988), 71 84) in which buyers learn their valuations only after meeting sellers. The other variant extends the model(More)
Do people move to cities because of marriage market considerations? In cities singles can meet more potential partners than in rural areas. Singles are therefore prepared to pay a premium in terms of higher housing prices. Once married, the marriage market benefits disappear while the housing premium remains. We extend the model of Burdett and Coles (1997)(More)
Employment Protection, Technology Choice, and Worker Allocation Using a country-industry panel dataset (EUKLEMS) we uncover a robust empirical regularity, namely that high-risk innovative sectors are relatively smaller in countries with strict employment protection legislation (EPL). To understand the mechanism, we develop a twosector matching model where(More)
Intra Firm Bargaining and Shapley Values* The paper revisits the problem of wage bargaining between a firm and multiple workers. We show that the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the extensive-form game proposed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) does not imply a profile of wages and profits that coincides with the Shapley values as claimed in their classic paper.(More)
This paper focuses on a congestion externality in the labor market which is caused by non sequential search. A model is presented in which unemployment is caused by selection delays of the employers It is shown that the individual probability to get a job offer is increasing in the number of applications but that the aggregate hiring rate is decreasing in(More)