Learn More
in Aix-en-Provence, and particularly Hideo Konishi for comments and suggestions that greatly improved the exposition of this work are gratefuly acknowledged. Part of this work was done while I was visiting the Institute of Mathematical Economics at Bielefeld University under the European research programme " Game-theoretic approaches to cooperation and(More)
We address the issue of optimal growth when standard-of-living aspirations are transmitted from one generation to the next. We derive the condition for the optimal solution to be stable in the saddle-point sense and show that this optimal solution may display damped oscillations even when the planner does not discount the utility of future generations(More)
Grandmont's ([14]) notion of behavioral heterogeneity is reformulated in a non parametric setup such that the space of budget share functions admits a " uniform " probability distribution. If the population is distributed according to this measure, the aggregate budget share function is constant with respect to changes in prices and income. This exact(More)
Sharing a damage that has been caused jointly by several tortfeasors is analyzed from a normative point of view. We show how a damage can be apportioned on two distinct basis, causation and degree of misconduct. Our analysis uses the concept of potential damage on the basis of which we define a transferable utility game. Its core defines acceptable(More)
A community faces the obligation of providing an indivisible public good that each of its members is able to provide at a certain cost. The solution is to rely on the member who can provide the public good at the lowest cost, with a due compensation from the other members. This problem has been studied in a non-cooperative setting by Kleindorfer and Sertel(More)
There exist three equivalent de®nitions of perfect Nash equilibria which di¨er in the way``best responses against small perturbations'' are de®ned. It is shown that applying the spirit of these de®nitions to ration-alizability leads to three di¨erent re®nements of rationalizable strategies which are termed perfect (Bernheim, 1984), weakly perfect and(More)
Consider an economy populated by males and females, both rich and poor. The society has to choose one of the following marriage institutions: polygyny, strict monogamy, and serial monogamy (divorce and remarriage). After having identified the conditions under which each of these equilibria exists, we show that a rise in the share of rich males can explain a(More)
The weighted value was introduced by Shapley in 1953 as an asymmetric version of his value. Since then several axiomatizations have been proposed including one by Shapley in 1981 specifically addressed to cost allocation, a context in which weights appear naturally. It was at the occasion of a comment in which only the axioms were stated. The present paper(More)
This paper is a …rst step in answering B. Villemeur's (1998,1999) and Hildenbrand's (1998) criticism of the notions of behav-ioral heterogeneity introduced in demand theory by Grandmont (1992) and Kneip (1999). As in the Grandmont-Kneip approach, we de…ne a notion of behavioral heterogeneity such that if the population is su¢ciently heterogeneous , the(More)
  • Jorge Durán, Alexandra Rillaers, +5 authors Víctor Ríos-Rull
  • 2001
We investigate the aggregate implications of individual speci…c uncertainty about returns to investment in education in the absence of insurance markets. We do so in a general equilibrium OLG model in which physical resources must be devoted to education in order to accumulate human capital. We conclude that uncertainty with incomplete …nancial markets may(More)