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We address the issue of optimal growth when standard-of-living aspirations are transmitted from one generation to the next. We derive the condition for the optimal solution to be stable in the saddle-point sense and show that this optimal solution may display damped oscillations even when the planner does not discount the utility of future generations… (More)

- Gaël Giraud, Isabelle Maret, Pierre Dehez, Rodolphe Dos Santos
- 2001

Grandmont's ([14]) notion of behavioral heterogeneity is reformulated in a non parametric setup such that the space of budget share functions admits a " uniform " probability distribution. If the population is distributed according to this measure, the aggregate budget share function is constant with respect to changes in prices and income. This exact… (More)

A group of firms considers collaborating on a project which requires putting together elements held by some of them. These elements are nonrival but excludable goods i.e. public goods with exclusion for instance knowledge, data or information, patents or copyrights. The present paper addresses the question of how firms should be compensated for the goods… (More)

- Pierre Dehez, Agnès Gramain, Isabelle Maret, Eve Ramaekers, Daniela Tellone
- 2012

A community faces the obligation of providing an indivisible public good that each of its members is able to provide at a certain cost. The solution is to rely on the member who can provide the public good at the lowest cost, with a due compensation from the other members. This problem has been studied in a non-cooperative setting by Kleindorfer and Sertel… (More)

There exist three equivalent de®nitions of perfect Nash equilibria which di¨er in the way``best responses against small perturbations'' are de®ned. It is shown that applying the spirit of these de®nitions to ration-alizability leads to three di¨erent re®nements of rationalizable strategies which are termed perfect (Bernheim, 1984), weakly perfect and… (More)

- Guillaume Haeringer, Carmen Beviá, Pierre Dehez, Carmen Herrero, Michel Le Breton, Jordi Massó +4 others
- 2000

in Aix-en-Provence, and particularly Hideo Konishi for comments and suggestions that greatly improved the exposition of this work are gratefuly acknowledged. Part of this work was done while I was visiting the Institute of Mathematical Economics at Bielefeld University under the European research programme " Game-theoretic approaches to cooperation and… (More)

- Pierre Dehez
- IGTR
- 2011

The weighted value was introduced by Shapley in 1953 as an asymmetric version of his value. Since then several axiomatizations have been proposed including one by Shapley in 1981 specifically addressed to cost allocation, a context in which weights appear naturally. It was at the occasion of a comment in which only the axioms were stated. The present paper… (More)

- David DE LA CROIX, Fabio MARIANI, Pierre Dehez, Oded Galor, Cecilia Garcia-Penalosa, Shoshana Grossbard +2 others
- 2012

Consider an economy populated by males and females, both rich and poor. The society has to choose one of the following marriage institutions: polygyny, strict monogamy, and serial monogamy (divorce and remarriage). After having identified the conditions under which each of these equilibria exists, we show that a rise in the share of rich males can explain a… (More)

Sharing a damage that has been caused jointly by several tortfeasors is analyzed from a normative point of view. We show how a damage can be apportioned on two distinct basis, causation and degree of misconduct. Our analysis uses the concept of potential damage on the basis of which we define a transferable utility game. Its core defines acceptable… (More)

- Pierre DEHEZ, Pierre Dehez, Agnès Gramain, Isabelle Maret, Eve Ramaekers
- 2012

A community faces the obligation of providing an indivisible public good that each of its members is able to provide at a certain cost. The solution is to rely on the member who can provide the public good at the lowest cost, with a due compensation from the other members. This problem has been studied in a non-cooperative setting by Kleindorfer and Sertel… (More)