Pierre Dehez

Learn More
A group of firms considers collaborating on a project which requires putting together elements held by some of them. These elements are nonrival but excludable goods i.e. public goods with exclusion for instance knowledge, data or information, patents or copyrights. The present paper addresses the question of how firms should be compensated for the goods(More)
A community faces the obligation of providing an indivisible public good that each of its members is able to provide at a certain cost. The solution is to rely on the member who can provide the public good at the lowest cost, with a due compensation from the other members. This problem has been studied in a non-cooperative setting by Kleindorfer and Sertel(More)
in Aix-en-Provence, and particularly Hideo Konishi for comments and suggestions that greatly improved the exposition of this work are gratefuly acknowledged. Part of this work was done while I was visiting the Institute of Mathematical Economics at Bielefeld University under the European research programme " Game-theoretic approaches to cooperation and(More)
The weighted value was introduced by Shapley in 1953 as an asymmetric version of his value. Since then several axiomatizations have been proposed including one by Shapley in 1981 specifically addressed to cost allocation, a context in which weights appear naturally. It was at the occasion of a comment in which only the axioms were stated. The present paper(More)
A community faces the obligation of providing an indivisible public good that each of its members is able to provide at a certain cost. The solution is to rely on the member who can provide the public good at the lowest cost, with a due compensation from the other members. This problem has been studied in a non-cooperative setting by Kleindorfer and Sertel(More)
This paper is a …rst step in answering B. Villemeur's (1998,1999) and Hildenbrand's (1998) criticism of the notions of behav-ioral heterogeneity introduced in demand theory by Grandmont (1992) and Kneip (1999). As in the Grandmont-Kneip approach, we de…ne a notion of behavioral heterogeneity such that if the population is su¢ciently heterogeneous , the(More)
Sharing a damage that has been caused jointly by several tortfeasors is analyzed from a normative point of view. We show how a damage can be apportioned on two distinct basis, causation and degree of misconduct. Our analysis uses the concept of potential damage on the basis of which we define a transferable utility game. Its core defines acceptable(More)
This research advances the hypothesis that reversal of fortunes in the process of economic development can be traced to the e¤ect of natural land productivity on the desirable level of cooperation in the agricultural sector. In early stages of development, unfavorable land endowment enhanced the economic incentive for cooperation in the creation of(More)
In this paper, we study a two-period pure exchange economy with idiosyncratic uncertainty, moral hazard and multiple consumption goods. We consider two different market structures: contingent commodity markets on the one hand, and financial plus spot commodity markets on the other hand. We propose a competitive equilibrium concept for each market structure.(More)