Pierre Dehez

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We address the issue of optimal growth when standard-of-living aspirations are transmitted from one generation to the next. We derive the condition for the optimal solution to be stable in the saddle-point sense and show that this optimal solution may display damped oscillations even when the planner does not discount the utility of future generations(More)
This paper studies the stability of a finite local public goods economy in horizontal differentiation, where a jurisdiction’s choice of the public good is given by an exogenous decision scheme. In this paper, we characterize the class of decision schemes that ensure the existence of an equilibrium with free mobility (that we call Tiebout equilibrium) for(More)
There exist three equivalent de®nitions of perfect Nash equilibria which di ̈er in the way ``best responses against small perturbations'' are de®ned. It is shown that applying the spirit of these de®nitions to rationalizability leads to three di ̈erent re®nements of rationalizable strategies which are termed perfect (Bernheim, 1984), weakly perfect and(More)
From Polygyny to Serial Monogamy: A Unified Theory of Marriage Institutions Consider an economy populated by males and females, both rich and poor. The society has to choose one of the following marriage institutions: polygyny, strict monogamy, and serial monogamy (divorce and remarriage). After having identified the conditions under which each of these(More)
This paper is a ...rst step in answering B. Villemeur’s (1998,1999) and Hildenbrand’s (1998) criticism of the notions of behavioral heterogeneity introduced in demand theory by Grandmont (1992) and Kneip (1999). As in the Grandmont-Kneip approach, we de...ne a notion of behavioral heterogeneity such that if the population is su¢ciently heterogeneous, the(More)
The paper studies equilibria for economies with imperfect competition and non-convex technologies. Following Negishi, firms maximise profits under downward-sloping perceived demand functions. Negishi’s assumptions, in particular the assumption of a single monopolistic competitor in each market, are relaxed. Existence of equilibria is obtained, under(More)
This research advances the hypothesis that reversal of fortunes in the process of economic development can be traced to the e¤ect of natural land productivity on the desirable level of cooperation in the agricultural sector. In early stages of development, unfavorable land endowment enhanced the economic incentive for cooperation in the creation of(More)
Sharing a damage that has been caused jointly by several tortfeasors is analyzed from a normative point of view. We show how a damage can be apportioned on two distinct basis, causation and degree of misconduct. Our analysis uses the concept of potential damage on the basis of which we define a transferable utility game. Its core defines acceptable(More)