Political Extremism Is Supported by an Illusion of Understanding
- Philip M. Fernbach, Todd Rogers, C. Fox, S. Sloman
- PsychologyPsychology Science
- 25 April 2013
The evidence suggests that people’s mistaken sense that they understand the causal processes underlying policies contributes to political polarization.
Navigating by the Stars: Investigating the Actual and Perceived Validity of Online User Ratings
- B. D. Langhe, Philip M. Fernbach, D. Lichtenstein
- Business
- 1 April 2016
This research documents a substantial disconnect between the objective quality information that online user ratings actually convey and the extent to which consumers trust them as indicators of…
Extreme opponents of genetically modified foods know the least but think they know the most
- Philip M. Fernbach, N. Light, Sydney E. Scott, Y. Inbar, P. Rozin
- PsychologyNature Human Behaviour
- 14 January 2019
In the United States, France and Germany, as peoples’ opposition to genetically modified (GM) foods becomes more extreme, their self-rated understanding of genetic modification increases, but objectively, their knowledge of the science behind genetic modification tends to be poorer.
Causal learning with local computations.
- Philip M. Fernbach, S. Sloman
- Computer ScienceJournal of Experimental Psychology. Learning…
- 1 May 2009
The data suggest that local computations serve as a heuristic for learning causal structure, and fitted data better than a Bayesian structural inference model without pretraining.
Asymmetries in predictive and diagnostic reasoning.
- Philip M. Fernbach, Adam Darlow, S. Sloman
- PsychologyJournal of experimental psychology. General
- 1 May 2011
It is concluded that people use causal structure to generate probability judgments in a sophisticated but not entirely veridical way.
Neglect of Alternative Causes in Predictive but Not Diagnostic Reasoning
- Philip M. Fernbach, Adam Darlow, S. Sloman
- PsychologyPsychology Science
- 17 February 2010
It is suggested that framing a problem as a diagnostic-likelihood judgment can reduce bias and neglect of alternative causes when people make predictive versus diagnostic probability judgments.
A quantitative causal model theory of conditional reasoning.
- Philip M. Fernbach, C. Erb
- Psychology, PhilosophyJournal of Experimental Psychology. Learning…
- 8 April 2013
A causal model theory of reasoning about conditional arguments with causal content that represents a synthesis across the disparate literatures on deductive, probabilistic, and causal reasoning is proposed and tested.
Explanation Fiends and Foes: How Mechanistic Detail Determines Understanding and Preference
- Philip M. Fernbach, S. Sloman, Rob St. Louis, Julia N. Shube
- Business
- 1 February 2013
People differ in their threshold for satisfactory causal understanding and therefore in the type of explanation that will engender understanding and maximize the appeal of a novel product.…
Known Unknowns: A Critical Determinant of Confidence and Calibration
- Daniel J. Walters, Philip M. Fernbach, C. Fox, S. Sloman
- PsychologyManagement Sciences
- 1 December 2017
It is proposed that an important determinant of judged confidence is the evaluation of evidence that is unknown or missing, and overconfidence is often driven by the neglect of unknowns, and considering the unknowns reduced overconfidence substantially and was more effective than the classic “consider the alternative” debiasing technique.
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