Philip Brock

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  • Edward J Kane Boston College, Richard Aspinwall, Philip Brock, Charles Calomiris, Aslι Demirguç-Kunt, Christopher Lamoreux +4 others
  • 2000
This report explains how differences in the informational and contracting environments of individual countries affect the optimal design of their financial safety nets and their optimal strategies for managing financial crises. Its purpose is to explain how to design and operate safety nets at minimum cost to taxpayers and well-managed banks in countries(More)
The components of graphical user interfaces can be made to dynamically expand as the cursor approaches, providing visually appealing effects. Expansion can be implemented in a variety of ways: in some cases the targets expand visually while maintaining a constant smaller motor-space for selection; and in others both the visual and motor-spaces of the(More)
The study of bank interest rate spreads is central to our understanding of the process of financial intermediation. Data limitations generally restrict empirical analyses to interest rate spreads that are constructed from bank income statements and balance sheets. In this paper we make use of a data set that allows us directly to compute interest rate(More)
  • Gerard Caprio, Philip Bartholomew, Philip Brock, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Paul Horvitz, Patrick Honohan +3 others
  • 1998
participants at a World Bank conference on International Financial Integration and participants at the Western Economic Association Meeting are gratefully acknowledged. Anqing Shi provided competent research assistance. Still, the findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author. They do not necessarily(More)
OBJECTIVE Our objective was to report and describe a case of psychosocial short stature in an adolescent girl with psychotic features. Psychosocial short stature is a rare condition in which emotional stress or deprivation in childhood profoundly reduces growth, leading to persistent short stature. This disorder is variably known as psychosocial dwarfism,(More)
  • Alice Peng-Ju, Su, Philip Brock, Charles Hill, Ben Keefer, Doyoung Kim +8 others
  • 2014
I study the optimal incentive provision in a principal-agent relationship with costly information acquisition by the agent. I emphasize that adverse selection or moral hazard is an endogenous choice of the principal via inducing or deterring information acquisition. The principal designs the contract not only to cope with an existing incentive problem, but(More)
  • Alice Peng-Ju, Su, Philip Brock, Charles Hill, Ben Keefer, Doyoung Kim +8 others
  • 2014
I study the optimal incentive provision in a principal-agent relationship with costly information acquisition by the agent. When it is feasible for the principal to induce or to deter perfect information acquisition, adverse selection or moral hazard arises in response to the principal's decision, as if she is able to design a contract not only to cope with(More)
  • Srobona Mitra, Arabinda Basistha, Philip Brock, Chang-Jin Kim, Levis Kochin, Luis
  • 2003
Monetary authorities have often voiced their concerns about a high debt level that could potentially restrain their ability to control the short-term interest rate as an instrument of monetary policy. However, monetary policy rules in the literature do not account for such constraints. This paper derives an augmented interest rate rule in which the response(More)