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Internet auctions have recently gained widespread popularity and are one of the most successful forms of electronic commerce. We examine a unique dataset of eBay coin auctions to explore the determinants of bidder and seller behavior. We first document a number of empirical regularities. We then specify and estimate a structural econometric model of bidding(More)
We present new identification results for models of first-price, second-price, ascending (English), and descending (Dutch) auctions. We analyze a general specification of bidders' preferences and the underlying information structure, nesting as special cases the pure private values and pure common values models, and allowing both ex ante symmetric and(More)
Ahmet Arzan and Derya Tamerler for helpful discussions about the Turkish Treasury auction system. Financial Abstract An important question in the theory of divisible good auctions is to determine whether a discriminatory auction yields higher revenues to the auctioneer than a uniform price or Vickrey auction. This question can be answered empirically using(More)
We consider identi…cation of nonparametric random utility models of multinomial choice using " micro data, " i.e., observation of the characteristics and choices of individual consumers. Our model of preferences nests random coe¢ cients discrete choice models widely used in practice with parametric functional form and distributional assumptions. However,(More)
This paper develops an estimation technique for analyzing the impact of technological change on the dynamics of consumer demand in a differentiated durable products industry. The paper presents a dynamic model of consumer demand for differentiated durable products that explicitly accounts for consumers' expectations of future product quality and consumers'(More)
We consider nonparametric identi…cation in models of di¤erentiated products markets , using only market level observables. On the demand side we consider a non-parametric random utility model nesting random coe¢ cients discrete choice models widely used in applied work. We allow for product/market-speci…c unobservables, en-dogenous product characteristics(More)
We develop tests for common values at first-price sealed-bid auctions. Our tests are nonparametric, require observation only of the bids submitted at each auction, and are based on the fact that the " winner's curse " arises only in common value auctions. The tests build on recently developed methods for using observed bids to estimate each bidder's(More)
Two features common to many auctions are the use of reserve prices and the existence of secondary markets for the goods being sold. Even in simple symmetric settings, the combination of these features can preclude existence of an equilibrium in symmetric separating bidding strategies. With a reserve price sufficiently far below the maximum (endogenous)(More)