Philip A. Haile

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Internet auctions have recently gained widespread popularity and are one of the most successful forms of electronic commerce. We examine a unique dataset of eBay coin auctions to explore the determinants of bidder and seller behavior. We first document a number of empirical regularities. We then specify and estimate a structural econometric model of bidding(More)
This chapter discusses structural econometric approaches to auctions. Remarkably, much of what can be learned from auction data can be learned without restrictions beyond those derived from the relevant economic model. This enables us to take a nonparametric perspective in discussing how the structure of auction models can be combined with observables to(More)
We develop tests for common values at first-price sealed-bid auctions. Our tests are nonparametric, require observation only of the bids submitted at each auction, and are based on the fact that the “winner’s curse” arises only in common value auctions. The tests build on recently developed methods for using observed bids to estimate each bidder’s(More)
An important question in the theory of divisible good auctions is to determine whether a discriminatory auction yields higher revenues to the auctioneer than a uniform price or Vickrey auction. This question can be answered empirically using estimates of the bidders’ true marginal valuations for the good being auctioned. Based on the share auction model of(More)
We consider identi…cation of nonparametric random utility models of multinomial choice using observation of consumer choices. Our model of preferences nests random coe¢ cients discrete choice models widely used in practice with parametric functional form and distributional assumptions. However, our model is nonparametric and distribution free. It(More)
This paper develops an estimation technique for analyzing the impact of technological change on the dynamics of consumer demand in a differentiated durable products industry. The paper presents a dynamic model of consumer demand for differentiated durable products that explicitly accounts for consumers’ expectations of future product quality and consumers’(More)
This paper studies auctions held before bidders are sure of the values they place on the object for sale, leaving potential gains to subsequent resale trade. While important insights from models of auctions without resale carry over, equilibrium bidding can be fundamentally altered by the endogeneity of valuations and the informational linkages between(More)
The quantal response equilibrium (QRE) notion of Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey (1995) has recently attracted considerable attention, due in part to its widely documented ability to rationalize observed behavior in games played by experimental subjects. However, even with strong a priori restrictions on unobservables, QRE imposes no falsifiable(More)