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Empirical models of demand for—and, often, supply of—differentiated products are widely used in practice, typically employing parametric functional forms and distributions of consumer heterogeneity. We review some recent work studying identification in a broad class of such models. This work shows that parametric functional forms and distri-butional(More)
We consider identi…cation of nonparametric random utility models of multinomial choice using observation of consumer choices. Our model of preferences nests random coe¢ cients discrete choice models widely used in practice with parametric functional form and dis-tributional assumptions. However, our model is nonparametric and distribution free. It(More)
We characterize the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria in symmetric separating strategies in the model of English auctions given by P. R. Milgrom and R. There is a continuum of such equilibria. The equilibrium derived by Milgrom and Weber is that in which bids are maximal. Only in the case of pure private values does a restriction to weakly undominated(More)
Two features common to many auctions are the use of reserve prices and the existence of secondary markets for the goods being sold. Even in simple symmetric settings, the combination of these features can preclude existence of an equilibrium in symmetric separating bidding strategies. With a reserve price sufficiently far below the maximum (endogenous)(More)
We present new identiÞcation results for models of Þrst-price, second-price, ascending (English), and descending (Dutch) auctions. We analyze a general speciÞcation of the latent demand and information structure, nesting as special cases the pure private values and pure common values models, and allowing both ex ante symmetric and asymmetric bidders. We(More)
We present new results on the identifiability of a class of nonseparable nonparametric simultaneous equations models introduced by Matzkin (2008). These models combine exclusion restrictions with a requirement that each structural error enter through a " residual index. " Our identification results encompass a variety of special cases allowing tradeoffs(More)
I have been asked by T-Mobile USA, Inc. 2 to comment on the revenue impact of spectrum-aggregation limits in the FCC's upcoming incentive auction. Elsewhere I focus on the rationale for limits, the overall experience with spectrum-aggregation limits, and the suitability of such limits in the FCC's upcoming incentive auction. 3 Here my main focus is the(More)
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