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We study matching markets in which institutions may have minimum and maximum quotas. Minimum quotas are important in many settings, such as hospital residency matching, military cadet matching, and school choice, but current mechanisms are unable to accommodate them, leading to the use of ad hoc solutions. We introduce two new classes of strategyproof(More)
To encourage diversity, schools often " reserve " some slots for students of specific types. Students only care about their school assignments and contractual terms like tuition, and hence are indifferent among slots within a school. Because these indifferences can be resolved in multiple ways, they present an opportunity for novel market design. We(More)
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t JEL classification: C78 D61 D63 I20 Keywords: Boston mechanism Gale–Shapley Deferred acceptance Ex-ante welfare Strategyproof School choice Recent work has highlighted welfare gains from the use of the Boston mechanism over deferred acceptance (DA) in school choice problems, in particular finding that when cardinal(More)
We consider the problem of allocating objects to agents when the objects have minimum quotas. There exist many real-world settings where minimum quotas are relevant. For example, in a hospital-resident matching problem, uncon-strained matching may produce too few assignments to a rural hospital. Surprisingly, almost 50 years have passed after the seminal(More)
Distributional constraints are important in many market design settings. Prominent examples include the minimum manning requirements at each Army branch in military cadet matching and diversity considerations in school choice, whereby school districts impose constraints on the demographic distribution of students at each school. Standard assignment(More)
Many institutions use matching algorithms to make assignments. Examples include the allocation of doctors, students and military cadets to hospitals, schools and branches, respectively. Most of the market design literature either imposes strong incentive constraints (such as strategyproofness) or builds mechanisms that, while more efficient than strongly(More)
This paper studies independent private value auctions where bidders have rank dependent preferences. We derive equilibrium bidding functions for the first price, second price and all pay auctions. By placing basic assumptions on the probability weighting function, we show that with sufficiently many bidders, the all pay auction yields greater expected(More)
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