Peter Troyan

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We study matching markets in which institutions may have minimum and maximum quotas. Minimum quotas are important in many settings, such as hospital residency matching, military cadet matching, and school choice, but current mechanisms are unable to accommodate them, leading to the use of ad hoc solutions. We introduce two new classes of strategyproof(More)
To encourage diversity, schools often “reserve” some slots for students of specific types. Students only care about their school assignments and contractual terms like tuition, and hence are indifferent among slots within a school. Because these indifferences can be resolved in multiple ways, they present an opportunity for novel market design. We introduce(More)
We consider the problem of allocating objects to agents when the objects have minimum quotas. There exist many realworld settings where minimum quotas are relevant. For example, in a hospital-resident matching problem, unconstrained matching may produce too few assignments to a rural hospital. Surprisingly, almost 50 years have passed after the seminal work(More)
Distributional constraints are important in many market design settings. Prominent examples include the minimum manning requirements at each Army branch in military cadet matching and diversity considerations in school choice, whereby school districts impose constraints on the demographic distribution of students at each school. Standard assignment(More)
In environments without transfers, such as refugee resettlement, school choice, organ transplants, course allocation, and voting, we show that Random Priority is the unique mechanism that is obviously strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and symmetric; hence providing an explanation for the popularity of this mechanism. We also construct the full class of(More)
Distributional constraints are important in many market design settings. Prominent examples include the minimum manning requirements at each Army branch in military cadet matching and diversity considerations in school choice, whereby school districts impose constraints on the demographic distribution of students at each school. Standard assignment(More)
Many institutions use matching algorithms to make assignments. Examples include the allocation of doctors, students and military cadets to hospitals, schools and branches, respectively. Most of the market design literature either imposes strong incentive constraints (such as strategyproofness) or builds mechanisms that, while more efficient than strongly(More)
In this supplementary appendix, we relax one of the key features of the DQDA mechanism: that the reduction sequence be exogenous to the submitted preferences. We define a new mechanism, the endogenous-reduction DQDA (EDQDA) mechanism that allows the reduction sequence to change depending on what preferences are submitted. Intuitively, this should allow the(More)