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We study matching markets in which institutions may have minimum and maximum quotas. Minimum quotas are important in many settings, such as hospital residency matching, military cadet matching, and school choice, but current mechanisms are unable to accommodate them, leading to the use of ad hoc solutions. We introduce two new classes of strategyproof(More)
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t JEL classification: C78 D61 D63 I20 Keywords: Boston mechanism Gale–Shapley Deferred acceptance Ex-ante welfare Strategyproof School choice Recent work has highlighted welfare gains from the use of the Boston mechanism over deferred acceptance (DA) in school choice problems, in particular finding that when cardinal(More)
We consider the problem of allocating objects to agents when the objects have minimum quotas. There exist many real-world settings where minimum quotas are relevant. For example, in a hospital-resident matching problem, uncon-strained matching may produce too few assignments to a rural hospital. Surprisingly, almost 50 years have passed after the seminal(More)
In environments without transfers, such as refugee resettlement, school choice, organ transplants, course allocation, and voting, we show that Random Priority is the unique mechanism that is obviously strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and symmetric; hence providing an explanation for the popularity of this mechanism. We also construct the full class of(More)
Distributional constraints are important in many market design settings. Prominent examples include the minimum manning requirements at each Army branch in military cadet matching and diversity considerations in school choice, whereby school districts impose constraints on the demographic distribution of students at each school. Standard assignment(More)
Many institutions use matching algorithms to make assignments. Examples include the allocation of doctors, students and military cadets to hospitals, schools and branches, respectively. Most of the market design literature either imposes strong incentive constraints (such as strategyproofness) or builds mechanisms that, while more efficient than strongly(More)
In this supplementary appendix, we relax one of the key features of the DQDA mechanism: that the reduction sequence be exogenous to the submitted preferences. We define a new mechanism, the endogenous-reduction DQDA (EDQDA) mechanism that allows the reduction sequence to change depending on what preferences are submitted. Intuitively, this should allow the(More)