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We study matching markets in which institutions may have minimum and maximum quotas. Minimum quotas are important in many settings, such as hospital residency matching, military cadet matching, and school choice, but current mechanisms are unable to accommodate them, leading to the use of ad hoc solutions. We introduce two new classes of strategyproof(More)
We consider the problem of allocating objects to agents when the objects have minimum quotas. There exist many real-world settings where minimum quotas are relevant. For example, in a hospital-resident matching problem, uncon-strained matching may produce too few assignments to a rural hospital. Surprisingly, almost 50 years have passed after the seminal(More)
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t JEL classification: C78 D61 D63 I20 Keywords: Boston mechanism Gale–Shapley Deferred acceptance Ex-ante welfare Strategyproof School choice Recent work has highlighted welfare gains from the use of the Boston mechanism over deferred acceptance (DA) in school choice problems, in particular finding that when cardinal(More)
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