Peter Troyan

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We study matching markets in which institutions may have minimum and maximum quotas. Minimum quotas are important in many settings, such as hospital residency matching, military cadet matching, and school choice, but current mechanisms are unable to accommodate them, leading to the use of ad hoc solutions. We introduce two new classes of strategyproof(More)
We consider the problem of allocating objects to agents when the objects have minimum quotas. There exist many real-world settings where minimum quotas are relevant. For example, in a hospital-resident matching problem, uncon-strained matching may produce too few assignments to a rural hospital. Surprisingly, almost 50 years have passed after the seminal(More)
In most of the auction design literature, bidders are assumed to have quasilinear preferences. Yet there are many economic environments where this restriction is violated: bidders may be risk averse, have wealth effects, face financing constraints or be budget constrained. I study the canonical private value auction model for a single good without the(More)
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t JEL classification: C78 D61 D63 I20 Keywords: Boston mechanism Gale–Shapley Deferred acceptance Ex-ante welfare Strategyproof School choice Recent work has highlighted welfare gains from the use of the Boston mechanism over deferred acceptance (DA) in school choice problems, in particular finding that when cardinal(More)
This paper investigates public information in Markov games in a laboratory experiment on an asymmetric partnership game where two partners both exert effort to complete projects that only benefit one of them. The main results are that the effect of informativeness on effort goes in the opposite direction than predicted theoretically (Kloosterman 2015a),(More)
  • Daniel E Fragiadakis, Peter Troyan, Blake Barton, Douglas Bernheim, Itay Fainmesser, Clayton Featherstone +11 others
  • 2015
Many institutions use matching algorithms to make assignments. Examples include the allocation of doctors, students and military cadets to hospitals, schools and branches, respectively. Most of the market design literature either imposes strong incentive constraints (such as strategyproofness) or builds mechanisms that, while more efficient than strongly(More)
We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches that may have multiple slots available to accept contracts. Each slot has its own linear priority order over contracts; a branch chooses contracts by filling its slots sequentially, according to an order of precedence. We demonstrate that(More)
Distributional constraints are important in many market design settings. Prominent examples include the minimum manning requirements at each branch in military cadet matching and diversity in school choice, whereby school districts impose constraints on the demographic distribution of students at each school. Standard assignment mechanisms implemented in(More)
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