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The 2001 Trading Agent Competition was the second in a series of events aiming to shed light on research issues in automating trading strategies. Based on a challenging market scenario in the domain of travel shopping, the competition presents agents with difficult issues in bidding strategy, market prediction, and resource allocation. Entrants in 2001(More)
Decentralized scheduling is the problem of allocating resources to alternative possible uses over time, where competing uses are represented by autonomous agents. Market mechanisms use prices derived through distributed bidding protocols to determine schedules. We investigate the existence of equilibrium prices for some general classes of scheduling(More)
Market mechanisms, such as auctions, will likely rep resent a common interaction medium for agents on the Internet. The Michigan Internet AuctionBot is a flexible , scalable, and robust auction server that supports both software and human agents. The server manages many aimultancous auctions by separating the interface from the core auction procedures. This(More)
We present a new method for computing pure strategy Nash equilibria for a class of <i>n</i>-person games where it is computationally expensive to compute the payoffs of the players as a result of the joint actions. Previous algorithms to compute Nash equilibria are based on mathematical programming and analytical derivation, and require a complete payoff(More)
We consider a general family of auction mechanisms that admit multiple buyers and sellers, and determine market-clearing prices. We analyze the economic incentives facing participants in such auctions, demonstrating that, under some conditions, it is possible to induce truthful revelation of values by buyers or sellers, but not both, and for single-but not(More)
We examine the design space of auction mechanisms and identify three core activities that structure this space. Formal parameters qualifying the performance of core activities enable precise specification of auction rules. This specification constitutes an auction description language that can be used in the implementation of configurable marketplaces. The(More)
We present an extensive breakdown of the auction design space that captures the essential similarities and diierences of many auction mechanisms in a format more descriptive and useful than simple taxonomies. This parametrization serves as an organizational framework in which to classify work within the eld, and uncovers parameter combinations corresponding(More)
ccasionally, mature industries are turned upside down by innovations. The years of research on robotics and multia-gent systems are coming together to provide just such a disruption to the material-handling industry. While autonomous guided vehicles (AGVs) have been used to move material within warehouses since the 1950s, they have been used primarily to(More)
Proxy bidding has proved useful in a variety of real auction formats , such as eBay, and has been proposed for combinatorial auctions. Previous work on proxy bidding in combinatorial auctions requires the auctioneer essentially run the auction with myopic bidders to determine the outcome. In this paper we present a radically different approach that computes(More)