Learn More
Decentralized scheduling is the problem of allocating resources to alternative possible uses over time, where competing uses are represented by autonomous agents. Market mechanisms use prices derived through distributed bidding protocols to determine schedules. We investigate the existence of equilibrium prices for some general classes of scheduling(More)
Market mechanisms, such as auctions, will likely rep resent a common interaction medium for agents on the Internet. The Michigan Internet AuctionBot is a flexible , scalable, and robust auction server that supports both software and human agents. The server manages many aimultancous auctions by separating the interface from the core auction procedures. This(More)
We consider a general family of auction mechanisms that admit multiple buyers and sellers, and determine market-clearing prices. We analyze the economic incentives facing participants in such auctions, demonstrating that, under some conditions, it is possible to induce truthful revelation of values by buyers or sellers, but not both, and for single-but not(More)
The 2001 Trading Agent Competition was the second in a series of events aiming to shed light on research issues in automating trading strategies. Based on a challenging market scenario in the domain of travel shopping, the competition presents agents with difficult issues in bidding strategy, market prediction, and resource allocation. Entrants in 2001(More)
We present a new method for computing pure strategy Nash equilibria for a class of <i>n</i>-person games where it is computationally expensive to compute the payoffs of the players as a result of the joint actions. Previous algorithms to compute Nash equilibria are based on mathematical programming and analytical derivation, and require a complete payoff(More)
We present an extensive breakdown of the auction design space that captures the essential similarities and diierences of many auction mechanisms in a format more descriptive and useful than simple taxonomies. This parametrization serves as an organizational framework in which to classify work within the eld, and uncovers parameter combinations corresponding(More)
The authors discuss the design and operation of a trading agent competition, focusing on the game structure and some of the key technical issues in running and playing the game. T rading in electronic markets is a topic of increasing interest within the artificial intelligence (AI) and electronic commerce research communities. As Internet marketplaces(More)
We discuss the design of a trading-agent competition, to be held in conjunction with ICMAS-00. This design will be revised based on deliberations of a committee comprising active r e s earchers in the eld. 1 This AmEC-99 presentation constitutes an oocial announcement o f the competition. We solicit feedback f rom the community r e g a r ding further(More)
We examine the design space of auction mechanisms and identify three core activities that structure this space. Formal parameters qualifying the performance core activities enables precise specification of auction rules. This specification constitutes an auction description language that can be employed in the implementation of configurable marketplaces.(More)
Millions of people participate in online auctions on websites such as eBay. The data available in these public markets offer interesting opportunities to study Internet auctions. We explore techniques for identifying common bidding patterns on eBay using data from eBay video game console auctions. The analysis reveals that there are certain bidding(More)